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This study attempted to investigate and interpret
subjects' reports of the sources of self-knowledge in light
of the growing 1 ucerature .about the shortcomings of social
judgment.

The basic tenet of this study was the subjects'

tendency to report self-observation at the expense of feed
back and social comparison as the best source of selfknowledge is based on an Implicit evaluation bias similar to
Schlenker's (1980) notion of "self-projection" and Jellison
and Greens'

(1981) "norm of internality."

It was predicted

that subjects’ Intuitive notions about the sources are such
that self-observation is seen as a generally "better" way to
learn things about yourself than feedback which, in turn, is
better than social comparison.
These hypotheses were tested by having subjects read
four short stories in which either a male or female charac
ter learns something good

u* bad about him or herself
1

through one of the sources of self-knowledge (selfobservation, unsolicited feedback, solicited feedback,
social comparison or a no source ending group).

They then

rated the characters on semantic differential type items and
rated the source itself for "accuracy," "reliability" and
"believeability."

A1 ..hough the measure of primary impor

tance in this study was the character ratings, it was
assumed that these ratings would be made in congruence with
the implicit evaluative notions about the different sources.
An additional set of measures used in this study was a
ranking procedure similar to those used by Schoeneman (1981) .
Several personality scales (Self-Consciousness Scale, StateTrait Anxiety Scale, Social Desirability Scale and The SelfMonitoring Scale) were also included in an exploratory part
of this study.
Results from the ranking portion of this study repli
cated the results of Schoeneman (1981) quite closely
demonstrating that the present subjects report the source of
self-knowledge in a similar manner to those reported in
earlier studies.

Several significant and theoretically

consistent differences were found between the source of
self-knowledge groups on the character rating measures.

The

predictions that self-observation would be seen most
favorably, social comparison would be reported least
favorably and solicited feedback would be reported more
neutrally were generallyjsupported.

Predictions regarding

unsolicited feedback and the no source ending group were not
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supported; they were reported as much worse and better,
respectively, than was expected.

Examination of the inde

pendent variables "trait valence," subject sex and character
sex produced a variety of main effects and interactions
which are typically consistent with findings already
reported in the sex-role stereotype literature.

The only

personality scale which produced any theoretically meaning
ful results was the social anxiety subscale of the SelfConsciousness Scale which showed that high social anxiety
subjects report sources as the best and worst in a pattern
nearly opposite that of the majority of subjects.
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ABSTRACT
This study attempted to investigate and interpret
subjects' reports of the sources of self-knowledge in light
of the growing literature about the shortcomings of social
judgment.

The basic tenet of this study was the subjects'

tendency to report self-observation at the expense of
feedback and social comparison as the best source of selfknowledge is based on an implicit evaluation bias similar
to Schlenkers (1980) notion of "self-projection" and
Jellison and Greens' (1981) "norm of internality."

It was

predicted that subjects’ intuitive notions about the sources
are such that self-observation is seen as a generally
"better" way to learn things about yourself than feedback
which, in ttirn, is better than social comparison.
These hypotheses were tested by having subjects read
four short stories in which either a male or female char
acter learns something good or bad about him or herself
through one of the sources of self-knowledge (self
observation, unsolicited feedback, solicited feedback,
social comparison or a no source ending group).

They then

rated the characters on semantic differential type items
and rated the source itself for "accuracy," "reliability"
and "believeability."

Although the measure of primary

xi

importance in this study was the character ratings, it was
assumed that these ratings would be made in congruence with
the implicit evaluative notions about the different sources.
An additional set of measures used in this study was a
ranking procedure similar to those used by Schoeneman
(1981).

Several personality scales (Self-Consciousness

Scale, State-Trait Anxiety Scale, Social Desirability Scale
and The Self-Monitoring Scale) were also included in an
exploratory part of this study.
Results from the ranking portion of this study repli
cated the results of Schoeneman (1981) quite closely
demonstrating that the present subjects report the source
of self-knowledge in a similar manner to those reported in
earlier studies.

Several significant and theoretically

consistent differences were found between the source of
self-knowledge groups on the character rating measures.

The

predictions that self-observation would be seen most
favorably, social comparison would be reported least
favorably and solicited feedback would be reported more
neutrally were generally supported.

Predictions regarding

unsolicited feedback and the no source ending group were not
supported; they were reported as much worse and better,
respectively, than was expected.

Examination of the inde

pendent: variables "trait valence," subject sex and character
sex produced a variety of main effects and interactions
which are typically consistent with findings already
reported in the sex-role stereotype literature.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
How do I xcarn things about myself?

For example, do I

know that I am friendly because I can see I have many
friends or because others tell me I am friendly or perhaps
because I seem friendlier than my peers?

How accurate and

reliable are these ways of learning about myself?

Is

noticing my own behavior the best way (since I can only
really depend on myself) or are other people even more
important in these decisions (because they may provide a
standard with which I may compare myself)?
Such questions and answers are examples of those a
person might ask him or herself and they also exemplify an
area of social psychology called "implicit personality
theory."

In this area the focus of study is on the average

person’s intuitive ideas about the structure and .processes
of personality.
One of the first researchers to study people's impres
sions of personality was Asch (1946) .

In his classic 1946

study, he gave brief descriptions of a target individual to
subjects who then rated the individual’s personality on a
variety of dimensions.

The results of his investigations

indicated that the words "warm” or "cold" embedded in

1
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identical lists of adjectives had a significant impact on
subjects' perceptions of the target individual.

"Warm" and

"cold" tended to serve as central organizing concepts such
that a warm individual was likely to be seen not only as
warmer but also as friendlier, kinder, moj e honest and
generally better than his or her cold counterpart.

In

recent years investigators have become interested in how
people .make use of central organizing concepts, such as
warm or cold.

They have termed these organizing concepts

"schemas."
Schema is a generic term for a variety of knowledge
structures that people use to understand the everyday world.
Wegner and Vallacher (1977) note that early writers, such as
Heider, suggested that schemas are "perceptual good
figures--just as a person tends to see a circle with a small
segment missing as a circle nonetheless, he sees groups in
particular ways because they look better, more complete, and
less confusing" (1977, p. 196).

While such gestalt explana

tions do not enjoy much popularity today, this quote
illustrates that schemas do have heuristic value as a form
of social shorthand.

Perhaps the best known form of

schemas are the person-schemas more commonly known as
stereotypes and schemas for sequences of events known as
scripts (Nisbett & Ross 1980).
Schemas are only one type of social judgment heuristic
that people use in everyday life.

Tverskv and-Kahneman

(1982) have identified two other heuristics, availability

3
and representativeness.

These heuristics together with

schemas allow social judgments to be made with a minimum of
effort.

People use ease of recall, (availability) as an

implicit measure of likelihood or frequency of events and
use resemblance (representativeness) as a categorization or
classification standard.

Thus, schemas and judgmental

heuristics may be considered as tools of social judgment
because they allow decisions to be made in a relatively
fast and easy manner.

However, as with most "fast and

easy" methods or shortcuts there are liabilities associated
with their use.

The tools of social judgment do often

produce characteristic errors such as stereotyped percep
tions of people. ' In addition, these tools may be used in
inappropriate situations and can also be used to supply
information to fill in for "missing data."
Schlenker (1930) and Jellison and Green (1981) suggest
that our tools of social judgment also affect our selfperception and self-presentation.

Both research and

personal experience suggest that, there are schemas, with an
evaluative component to them, common to most members of a
given culture.

In other words these can be considered as

stereotypes (i.e., schema or script) with a characteristic
evaluation aspect (i.e., most people see the stereotype as
good or bad).

Consider the standard script for greeting a

friend we haven't seen for months, in response to a hearty
"How are you?," the expected response is "Fine, and how are
you?"

The poor soul who answers this "question" with a

4
listing of personal troubles will now have another problem:
he or she has violated a social norm.

Another example is

the "norm of internality" where individuals who cite
internal causes of behavior receive more social approval
than those citing external causes (Jellison & Green 1981).
Given that peoples' tools of social judgment affect
not only decisions but evaluations of people and events a
unique theoretical framework to investigate people's
implicit notions of personality is provided.

In the open

ing remarks of this section allusions were made to several
questions which might be investigated.

One particularly

interesting question is "How do people report the ways in
which they learn things about themselves?"
Schoeneman (1981) was the first to study the above
question; he called this area the study of "Reports of the
Sources of Self-Knowledge."

He used as response categories

three forms of self-validation from the social psychological
literature:

self-observation (Bern 1972); social feedback

(Cooley 1902; Mead 1934); and social comparison (Festinger
1954).

Results from his studies indicate that college

students (Schoeneman 1981; Nash & Schoeneman Note 1) endorse
self-observation as the best way to learn something about
themselves, followed by feedback and comparison.

Similarly,

children also rate self-observation as the "very best"
source of self-knowledge (Schoeneman, Tabor & Nash Note 2).
While these studies do not indicate hox<' people actually find
things out about themselves, they do suggest

a

tendency, or
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perhaps a bias, to report self-observation as the best
source of self-knowledge.

These results have suggested to

Schoeneman (1981) and Nash and Schoeneman (Note 1) that the
subjects' desire to respond in a way which will make them
appear in the best possible light may be responsible for the
consistent pattern in which the sources of self-knowledge
are reported.
It may be that the tendency to report self-observation
as the best source of self-knowledge is a function of one's
tools of social judgment.

Indeed, it is the hypothesis of

this study that subjects' selections of the sources of selfknowledge may be accounted for by the implicit social
desirability of each source.

For example, it may be that

self-observation is "representative" of a better stereotype
while social comparison is "representative" of less desira
ble stereotypes.

Schoeneman (1981) presented very similar

arguments when he suggested that self-observation may be
associated with such typically American values as
independence and self-reliance while comparison involves
reliance on others, and possibly suggests uncertainty or
other unfavorable dispositions.
In the present study, university students were pre
sented with several brief narrative accounts of people who
learned things about themselves by using the different
sources of self-knowledge.

Dependent measures were obtained

from the subjects' impressions of the self-learners and of
the way in which they learned about themselves.

As part of

this study it was also possible to look for relationships
between anxiety (Spielberger et al. 1968), self-monitoring
(Snyder 1974), self-consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier &
Buss 1975) , social desirability (Crowne & Marlowe 1964),
and subjects’ reports of the sources of self-knowledge.
Before the study is characterized in more specific
detail, it is appropriate to review some relevant literature
To add clarity and organization to this task several parts
will be considered independently before bringing together
information from each area and forming the experimental
questions.

Following is a review of Schoeneman's work with

reports of the sources of self-knowledge, a look at the
tools of social judgment such as schemas and heuristics,
and finally an examination of how these tools of social
judgment affect our self-presentation.

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Reports, of the Sources of Self-Knowledge
The empirical study of people's reports of the sources
‘of self-knowledge is a relatively new area of interest in
the field of social psychology.

Schoeneman (1981) studied

college students' reports of the importance of three dif
ferent self-validational processes:

self-observation,

feedback from others and social comparison.

Schoeneman

(1981) notes that the concept of self-observation is found
in work by Bern (1967, 1972) and Duval and Wicklund (1972);
it is defined as a condition in which an individual is
attending to his or her own thoughts, feelings and behav
iors.

The concept of feedback from others comes from the

tradition of symbolic interactionism (Cooley 1902; Mead
1934).

This source of self-knowledge involves evaluating

and making inferences from implicit and explicit feedback
from others.

The final source is social comparison

(Festinger 1954) which involves comparisons between an
individual's and others' thoughts, feelings and behaviors.
Studies using reports of these three sources of selfknowledge as dependent variables have yielded a consistent
pattern of results.

When asked the question "What is the
7
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best way for you to learn something about yourself?,"
college students overwhelmingly report self-observation as
the preferred mode of self-validation followed by feedback
and social comparison (Schoeneman 1981, Nash & Schoeneman
Note 1).

Indeed, in both of these studies two independent

sets of response measures, a free response method involving
subjects writing brief paragraphs and a ranking procedure,
yielded similar patterns of results.

Use of the free

response method allowed the "number of mentions" for each
source to be calculated and produced ratios of 7:2:1 (for
self-observation:feedback:social comparison), which, gives
some idea of the direction and magnitude, of the self
observation preference.
similar results.

The ranking variables also produced

In another study, Schoeneman, Tabor and

Nash (Note 2) found that children aged four to eight select
self-observation as the "very best" source much more often
than feedback or social comparison.
Thus, studies to date indicate that subjects quite
consistently report self-observation, to the exclusion of
the more social sources, as the best way to learn something
about themselves.

Schoeneman (1981) has postulated three

ways in which to account for these findings:

subjects are,

in fact, telling us how they learn about themselves; sub
jects are responding based on the relative perceptual
salience of each source; or that subjects are responding
based on an impression management or self-presentation
strategy.

9
Evidence to date seems to point toward the latter
hypotheses.

There seems to be little justification to

believe that subjects are producing‘a correct introspective
account of their sources of self-knowledge (Nisbett & Wilson
1977).

Similarly, at least one study which investigated the

salience account failed to find support-for this hypothesis
(Nash & Schoeneman Note 1).
Nash and Schoeneman (Nope 1) used two sets of manipula
tions to change the relative perceptual salience of each
source in an attempt to influence subjects' reports of the
sources of self-knowledge.

One set of manipulations was

the wording of stimulus questions.

Subjects were given the

same type of personally worded open ended questions as in
Schoeneman1s (1981) study:

”1 have come to know I am a(n)

(adj ective) person f r o m ________________ ."

The wording "I"

was predicted to direct attention to the self, making it
more salient, resulting in higher numbers of self-observa
tion responses,

This was contrasted with an impersonal

wording, ’'People come to know: that they are (adjective)
people from __ ____ ________ which was expected to make the
self less salient and the social sources more salient and
hence reported more often.
The second set.of manipulations involved having sub
jects complete the stimulus materials exposed to a facial
mirror or an operating video camera in an attempt to induce
states of private or public self-awareness (Buss 1980).
Private self-awareness is a state where attention is
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directed toward private inner experiences such as thoughts
and feelings.

'The increased attention to the private self

was expected to make self-observation more salient, result
ing in more reports of this source.

Alternatively, public

self-awareness, a state where attention is directed toward
aspects of the self that can be readily observed by others,
was expected to increase reports of the social sources as a
function of the increased attention to the public self.
Thus, in each case the self-awareness manipulation serves
to make different sources more ’'available" (Tversky &
Kahneman 1974) and hence more likely to be reported
(Scheier, Buss & Buss 1978).

However, the results of this

study provided no support for the salience hypothesis;
neither set of manipulations had any effect on subject’s
responses.
Schoeneman (1981) has reported some support for the
self-presentation account.

In one study subjects' reports

were correlated with the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability
Scale (Crowne & Marlowe 1964).

He found that social desira

bility was significancly correlated with percent mention of
social comparison (r [67] - -0.22) and with average rank of
feedback (r [67] - -0.23).
In a separate investigation he asked college students
to indicate which of the sources of self-knowledge was Che
best under four instructional conditions.
report which was best in order:

They were to

i) to appear in the best

possible light, ii) to appear in the worst possible light,
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iii) to answer as most college students would, iv) to
answer as truthfully and honestly as possible.
The results of this study show the "best light" and
"truthful" conditions were quite similar, and that "worst
light" and "other students" were also nearly identical

(see

Table 1).
. TABLE 1
PERCENT OF SUBJECTS CITING EACH SOURCE FOR FOUR
IMAGINAL CONDITIONS (SCHOENEMAN 1981)
Source of Self-Knowledge
Self- .
Observation

Feedback

Social
Comparison

Best light

51

35

14

Worst light

24

25

51

Truthful and honest

52

39

9

Like other college
students

21

34

40

Imaginal Condition

■
:

It Is curious that subjects’seem to evaluate selfobservation so positively and social comparison so nega
tively while feedback remains relatively unchanged.
Schoeneman (1981) suggests that self-observation and social
comparison may vary more since these processes require more
effort and must be intentionally initiated, while feedback
may not always require such an active role.

Thus, the

element of subjective effort tells us that the self-learners
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want to know something about themselves and the way subjects
report going about this may then be important.

It is possi

ble that, for example, social comparison may violate the
"norm of internality" (individuals who report internal
causes for behavior receive more social approval than those
citing external causes [Jellison & Green 1981]) and as
Schoeneman (1981) suggested may imply uncertainty or other
unfavorable dispositions.

In contrast, a self-observer may

seem more in touch with him or herself.

Indeed, it is just

such a hypothesis we. will investigate in the present study.
In general it is hypothesized that there is an implicit
relationship between the sources of self-knowledge and a
good-bad evaluative dimension.

This relationship may be

thought of as analogus to Asch's (1946) finding of a rela
tionship between "warm-cold" and "good-bad" or Jellison and
Green's (1981) finding of a relationship between "internalexternal" attribution and "good-bad."
Self-observation is predicted to be seen as a subjec
tively "better" way of self-validation than social comparison
or feedback.

An individual's cognitive representation of

the concept of self-observation, or a self-observer, may be
organized such, that: there is an implicit evaluative judg
ment of the concept and those who use it.

Similar organizing

concepts, with accompanying evaluative components, may also
exist for feedback and social comparison.

The basic

hypothesis of this study is that there is an intuitive
relationship between the cognitive representations of the
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sources of self-knowledge and culturally shared assumptions
about human behavior.
Before specifying more clearly the parameters of the
study though, it is appropriate to review some additional
areas which will provide the theoretical basis for the
investigation.

The major area to be examined will be one

which focuses on the tools of social judgment, that is,
intuitive principles of person perception.

Central to this

discussion will be a. look at human inference strategies such
as schemas, scripts, stereotypes and judgmental heuristics.
An important facet of these discussions will deal with the
frequent inappropriate use of these strategies.

Here the

focus will be on the shortcomings of social judgment; situa
tions in which people fail to correctly determine the
causes of behavior.

Indeed, in man}7, cases biased reports

are related to the tools of social judgment which often
involve "logical shortcuts.”

The.final area to be reviewed

will deal with impression management.

In particular

research will be examined which suggests that impressions
may be unintentionally and unknowingly biased to endorse
certain traits or personality characteristics more favorably.
This will lay the groundwork for a discussion of the
present study, an investigation of reports of the sources
of self-knowledge as a function of implicit impression
management biases. .

14
The Tools of Social Judgment: Schemas
and Judgmental Heuristics
The empirical study of social judgment has its roots
in Asch's classic 1946 study "Forming Impressions of Person
ality."

Interestingly enough, in the intervening years,

his experimental design for studying person perception has
not been significantly improved upon (Krauss 1981).

Perhaps

the major change in the Asch (1946, 1952) paradigm for
investigating impressions of personality has been to rename
this area "person perception" (Schneidec, Hastorf, &
Ellsworth 1979).
In the Asch (1946) study, subjects rated an individual
on a variety of bipolar descriptors, such as shrewd-wise,
unhappy-happy, ruthless-humane, and strong-weak, after
hearing one of the following sets of descriptions of the
individual:

i) intelligent-skillful-industrious-warm-

determined-practical-cautious or ii) intelligent-skillfulindustrious-cold-determined-practical-cautious.

Of course,

these sets of descriptors are identical except for the
words "warm" or "cold."

His results indicated that these

words had a pronounced effect on subject's impressions of
the target individual.

Asch reports that "these results

show that a change in one character-quality has produced a
wide-spread change in the entire impression.

Further, the

written sketches show that the terms ’warm-cold’ did not
simply add a ne* quality, but to some extent transformed
the other characteristics" '(1946, p. 264).
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Thus, Asch's data clearly showed that people are quite
willing to organize impressions and even infer traits based
on central organizing concepts like warm or cold.

What

Asch did not fully address was what are these "central
organizing concepts" and how do they work.
topic to be covered in the present section.

This is the
It will be

shown that Asch’s central organizing concepts are merely
one of the many tools of social judgment that people use.
Before starting the discussion of specific tools of
social judgment a note of caution is in order.

Much of the

research into these concepts has focused on the liabilities
associated with their use.

Thus, the following discussion

may, unintentionally, seem to indicate that social judgment
is always very poor.

In a discussion of the magnitude of

social judgment errors, Wegner and VaJ.lacher (1981) perhaps
sum up the current state of this area when they say that
bias is not as p-et'vasive as some (Ross 1977; Nisbett &
Wilson 1977) indicate or that attributional accuracy is not
as good as others (Kelley 1967) indicate.

The present

author agrees with the position that bias does exist in
some situations which may be clearly specified.

However,

the tools of social judgment also have advantages already
mentioned such as ease and speed in making decisions.
Indeed, Nisbett and Ross (1980) point out that the overall
liabilities of misattribution in everyday life are small
and the damage produced by biased judgments is probably
minimal.

With these thoughts in mind, the discussion will
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move on to the. specific tools of social judgment and their
liabilities.
Schemas
Returning to a discussion of Asch's (1946) study for a
moment, recall that he found that not only could subjects'
impressions be dichotomized based on warm-cold polarities
but that "warm" individuals were also seen as being more
good natured, socially popular, generous, humorous and
humane.

Indeed, as Wishner (1960) found by re-examining

Asch's data there were strong correlations among certain
traits which seem to suggest that these traits were per
ceived to go togehter by Asch's subjects.

Implicit "going

together" such as this has been called by many names:
schemas, personae, stereotypes, prototypes and scripts
(Taylor & Crocker 1981; Nisbett & Ross 1980).

While some

of these terms may be differentiated from others (i.e.,
schemas are a general term referring to knowledge struc
tures; personae, stereotypes and prototypes are personschemas and scripts are event-schemas) they are all similar
in that they are knowledge structures (Nisbett & Ross 1980).
While the present discussion deals primarily with the social
psychological aspects of schemas, it should be noted that
schemas are by no means limited to just this one area of
psychology (Neisser 1976).

For our purposes of studying

person perception, Nisbett and Ross provide a good defini
tion of person schemas; they are "knowledge structures
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representing the persons"! characteristics and typical
behaviors of particular 'stock characters'" (1980, p. 35).
Currently schema theory has unfortunately not reached
a point where the properties of schemas c?n be confidently
defined, and there, are also still questions about the type
of function they serve and the conditions under which they
are used (Nisbett & Ross 1980).

Taylor and Crocker (1981)

indicate that most studies of schemas have merely been demon
strations of the presence of schematic effects and that
schematic hypotheses are typically not formulated in a
manner allowing them to be shown false.

Keeping in mind

that schema theory is somewhat lacking in scientific rigor,
let us continue our discussion by examining the known
properties of schemas.
Asch's study illustrates how schemas function:

they

tell us what someone should be like but less about what they
should not be like (Taylor & Crocker 1981).

We know "warm"

people are good natured and so on, but what traits fail to
appear in "warm" individuals?

Schemas seem to serve a

heuristic function by allowing us to say that a prototypical
or "good" representation of the schema has a high number of
traits in common with other schema members and a low number
of traits in common with nonmembers, but they provide no
information about what traits should not appear (Rosch &
Mervis 1975; Cantor & Mischel 1977).

As Nisbett and Ross

(1980) point out, schemas are not the results of veridical
data observation, storage and recall.

Rather, our schemas
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seem to influence both our perception and our interpretation
of events and vice versa (Tayloi* & Crocker 1981) .

These two

functions will be examined in more detail in the following
sections.
Perceptual Aspects of Schemas
In this section we will examine the effects that
schemas have on the encoding and storage components of
memory.

When someone observes an event, schemas impose

order and structure on the events they are seeing.

Thus,

when seeing a social interaction one is not likely to see
it as a. chaotic series of random events.

Depending on what

is known, or is thought to be known, about the situation it
will probably be seen as containing some meaningful struc
ture such as grouping or temporal sequence (Taylor & Crocker
1981) .

Consider the following example from Taylor and

Crocker:
Suppose we see a room full of people chatting pleas
antly and' drinking.
There are roughly equal numbers
of men and women, and one man in the corner is talking
at length to a group of assembled listeners.
If x^e
are told that this is an office party, we will
probably assume, however incorrectly, that the men
are executives, and the women are secretaries, and
the pontificating individual in the corner is the
boss.
Informed that the same group is a room full of
friends, xve will assume that the people are of eqxial
status, the men and xvomen are husbands and wives, and
the pontificating individual is merely pompous (1981,
p. 94).
In. addition to lending structure and organization to
events, schemas help determine whether or not information
x>7ill be encoded or retrieved from memory.

When facing a
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social situation such as the one presented above for
example, there are potentially counrless details one might
remember.

The way in which the situation is organized by a

schema will have a pronounced effect on what is recalled
about that situation.

Research suggests that the mere

presence of an organizing schema will facilitate recall,
especially for schema-consistent information (Ailport &
Postman 1947, Cantor & Mischel 1977; Owens, Bower & Black
Note 3).

In the present discussion, encoding and retrieval

effects are discussed together since studies have found
evidence for both types of effects and a discussion of the
relative strength of these effects is beyond the scope of
the present project (see Bower Note 4 and Rothbart, Evans
& Fulero 1979 for a fuller account).
In addition to affecting encoding and recall of events,
a large body of literature suggests that schema-consistent
information is processed more quickly than schema inconsist
ent information.

Markus (1977) found that schemas affect

processing time, problem solving speed and information flow
speed.

Taylor and Crocker (1981) suggest that most of the

studies on which the information processing conclusions have
been drawn are somewhat simplistic compared to the typically
complex social schemas.

However, they do feel that some

degree of generalization to social schemas may be warranted
and hypothesize that social schemas allow for generally
shorter information processing latencies.
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Interpretative Aspects of Schemas
In this section topics more germane to the present
study will be examined:

such as the way schemas are used to

interpret meaning and make decisions.

The reader may note

some similarity between topics discussed here and those
mentioned in the previous section.

This similarity is

unavoidable since some blurring of events occurs during the
rapid flow of the information processing sequences.

This

is due, in part, to the current inability of schema theory
to differentiate these effects more clearly.

Indeed,

Nisbett and Ross (1980), in reviewing the current state of
schema research, note that even the dynamics of schema
arousal, how we call up a given schema in a given situation,
are not clearly understood.

(Two of the most promising

leads, the availability and representativeness heuristics
(Tversky & Kahneman 1974), will be dealt with in more detail
in later sections.)

The focus in this section will be on

three major interpretation functions of schemas:

providing

an evaluative framework in which to view events, helping
people predict future events, and helping people make
decisions often using incomplete data.

Several of these

functions, especially the last one, will also illustrate
how interpretations based on schemas may not always be
accurace.
It was noted earlier that schemas tend to provide a
framework in which to view events.

It should come as little

surprise then that schemas affect how a situation is
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evaluated.

Existing schemas are often used as criteria for

evaluating experience.

This is especially true in situa

tions in which someone has schema-based expectations prior
to stimulus

situations being encountered.

In such a

situation, a comparison is made between the current situa
tion and previously generated expectations.

Recalling

Taylor and Crocker’s (1981) example of the room full of men
and women, if one is led to believe it is either an office
party or a group of friends the observed behaviors will be
compared to very different sets of standards.
lecturing boss (or the pompous friend).
this individual depends on two things:

Recall the

Our evaluation of
the desirability or

value of the social role and the degree to which he or she
fulfills that role (Higgins & Rholes 1976).

Thus, a boss

who commands the attention and respect of his or her subor
dinates may be seen positively while a friend displaying the
same behaviors will be- seen less positively since lecturing
to one's friends is a poor fulfillment of the friend role.
Some research suggests that both transient emotional
or situational effects and more long term personality
characteristics of the perceiver may have an impact on what
is seen.

For example Feshback and Feshback (1963) found

that scared children rate photographs of other children as
being scared while controls do not.

Dornbush et a l . (1965)

found that when two people observe someone, their descrip
tions overlap by 45% but when one person describes two
different people the overlap is 57%.

Wegner and Vallacher
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(1977) interpreted this as evidence that both who we are and
how we feel affects our judgments of others.
A second general interpretative aspect of schemas
involves using them to predict future events or behaviors.
Having a schema for events or types of persons likely to be
encountered provides ono which behavioral expectations for
these situations (Abelson 1976; Scrunk & Abelson 1977).
example most people have a going to a movie "script."

For
This

script provides a framework to predict the sequence of
events involved in going to a movie:

arriving early to

purchase tickets at a ticket booth, having one’s ticket torn
in half before entering the theater, going through the
lobby and buying popcorn or a snack, being seated and remain
ing quiet during the movie and leaving after it's over.
Interestingly enough scripts and schemas may also
change future events.

Rosenthal and Jacobsen's (1968)

demonstration of the "Pygmalion effect" demonstrated that
leading teachers to believe in a "late bloomer" schema
actually led to increased levels of academic performance in
the "late bloomer" children (although it must be noted that
this study has been severely critized on methodological
grounds).

Other researchers have also demonstrated similar

effects for attributes as diverse as perception of physical
attractiveness (Snyder, Tanke & Berscheid 1977), expectation
of aggression (Snvder & Swann 1976) , and expectation of
personality traits (Snyder & Swann 1978).
A third way in which schemas affect interpretation of

23
events is by supplying "missing data."

When presented with

a stimulus situation which is incomplete in some aspect, a
schema may fill in the missing data with schema-consistent
information (Taylor & Crocker 1981) .

Once again recall the

example of the group of men and women standing in a room
talking.

How were the individuals dressed?

If the occasion

was the office party the probable reply would be suits for
the men, pantsuits or perhaps dresses for the women, while
jeans or causal wear would be a more likely answer if the
group were friends.

A better, and more natural, example of

an intrusive schema effect-may be found in the suggestion
to recall the above example.

It was stated that the group

was standing in a room when in fact this

information was

not given in the scenario and is a schema-consistent infer
ence (to this author).

This schema-consistent inference

was not inserted to "test" the reader's ability to detect
intrusive errors but is one that escaped the present
author's notice during earlier drafts of this paper.
The type of error made by this author is quite similar
to those reported by Cantor and Mischel (1977, 1979) and
Cohen (1977) for people to believe that new, schemaconsistent, information has been presented earlier.

Indeed,

the inference Ct^ated by this author was treated in exactly
such a manner.

Not only did he believe that the people

were "standing” but that he had read this earliei*.
Taylor and Crocker (1981) consider the tendency for
inconsistent or irrelevant data to be accepted as schema-
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consistent a "type one" error:

as in this term's statisti

cal sense it means accepting a wrong hypothesis as being
correct.

They postulate four ways in which this may happen:

(1) the possibility that the schema is stored with a data
base-of confirming instances;

(2) criteria for matching

schemas are so general that neutral and negative instances
are accepted;

(3) in the rare case of schematic disconfir-

mation the schema is not revised but further differentiated
in a "yes, but . . . "

manner;

(4) schemas are only checked

one at a time and after the first confirming schema is
found, additional processing or cross-checking with other
schemas is stopped.
A result,of these "type one" errors may be that schemas
frequently are unknowingly used in inappropriate or wrong
situations.

Langer and Abelson (1974) had subjects listen

to a structured conversation between two men under the
instructional set that the situation was either a psychiat
ric intake or a job interview.

Not surprisingly, in the

former condition subjects heard more "pathology" than in
the latter condition.

Also of interest is the fact that no

subjects contested the idea that the situation was either
an intake or interview.

Indeed, subjects had no trouble

finding "evidence" on which to base interpretations of the
person's job or psychiatric status.

Other data also

suggests that at times schemas can be quite global and
undifferentiating.

Miyamoto and Dornbush (1956) found that

subjects perceived that I.Q., self-confidence, physical
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attractiveness and likableness were all correlated.

Koltov

(1962) and Berman and Kenney (1976) suggest that such
implicit going together are reminiscent of Asch's findings
and may be due to connotative or semantic similarity
between traits rather than empirical correlation of these
attributes.

Such indications that "good things go together"

will be an important part of the present study.

However,

before going into a discussion of the implications of
schemas for this study the. discussion of tools of,social
judgment will continue with a look at judgmental heuristics.

Heuristics
As has been seen in earlier sections, when people are
facing a decision they often use intuitive tools of social
judgment such as schemas.

In a series of papers Tversky

and Kahneman (1971, 1973, 1974; Kahneman & Tversky 1972,
1973; also see Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky 1982) identified
two additional tools of social judgment:
and representativeness heuristics.

the availability

These heuristics are

similar to each other and to schemas, because they are used
as "logical shortcuts" in decision making.

By "logical

shortcuts" it is meant that these heuristics are not formal
decision making strategies in which evidence is carefully
examined in an explicit and invariant manner.

Rather, they

are informal strategies which tend to be used automatically
and typically without careful consideration of their appro
priateness (Nisbett & Ross 1980).

Even so, these relatively
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simple heuristics probably result in more correct decisions
than incorrect ones with a great savings of time and energy.
Indeed, as Nisbett and Ross (1980) stress, such "strategies"
are invaluable for organisms such as humans who must make
many decisions and inferences.

The present discussion of

heuristics, however, will focus primarily on liabilities
associated with heuristic use.

This will be done since

these aspects of heuristics are both better understood and
more relevant for this project.
Representativeness
The representativeness heuristic refers to a method
for assessing the degree to which a given stimulus or event
is representative, or similar, to a class or set of stimuli
or events.

Put more simply, this heuristic refers to the

"goodness of fit" between the situation being evaluated and
its presumed characteristics (Nisbett & Ross 1980).

In the

present discussion, three types of situations where the
representativeness heuristic is frequently used will be
presented.
The first type of situation in which representativeness
is used is when someone has to predict an outcome or the
chance that an event will happen based on prior knowledge
about the upcoming event.

In this case the judgment of

"representativeness" is based on the similarity of outcome
and origin.

Fob example consider the following problem

posed by Nisbett and Ross:

"Subjects are asked to assess
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the relative likelihood of three particular sequences of
births of boys (B) or girls (G) for the next 6 babies born
in the United States.

Those sequences are i) BBBBBB,

ii) GGGBBB, iii) GBBGGB" (1980, p. 24).

They suggest most

subjects will select the third choice (GBBGGB) as the most
likely since it seems more "representative" of the process
of birth, i.e., birth is seen as a chance event with the
liklihood of a boy or girl seemingly equal.

Intuitively,

choices i) and ii) both seem too orderly and do not capture
the spirit of the "random" process and would seem poor
choices.

By now a reader well versed In probability theory

may have calculated that the probabilities of all three
sequences are nearly identical.

The first sequence is

reported by Nisbett and Ross to actually be the most likely
since there are more boy than girl babies born while choices
two and three are equally likely.
Another closely related situation where representative
ness produces incorrect decisions is the well-noted
"gamblers fallacy" (Tversky & Kahneman 1974).

In this

example after a long run of "heads" in a coin toss or "reds"
on a roulette wheel people often believe that "tails" or
"black" becomes more likely.

This is because on the next

trial a different outcome is seen as being "due" to give the
appearance of a "random process."

As in the previous example

a run of events, be it boy births or heads in a coin toss,
does not seem as representative of a chance process as does
a mixed up order.
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The representativeness heuristic is also used to make
decisions in the opposite situation:
of antecedents to consequences.

judging the similarity

Here one is faced with

determining the cause of some existing event.

In the

process of finding causal agents, people often look for
something which resembles or is representative of the cur
rent situation.

Evidence to the strength of this heuristic

is plentiful in the medical folklore of primitive, and not
so primitive, cultures where a cure is often no more than
the opposite of a symptom.

Indeed, in nineteenth century

medicine this "property" was known as the "doctrine of
signatures" and suggested that "the lungs of a fox must be
a specific remedy for asthma, because the animal is remarka
ble for its strong powers of respiration.

Tumeric has a

brilliant yellow color, which indicates it has the power for
curing the jaundice" (Mill 1974, p. 767).
The final use of the representativeness heuristic to be
considered involves assessments of the degree of similarity
between instances and categories.

This type of task usually

is of the form "Is part A a member of class 1 or class 2?"
Consider the following description of a university profes
sor.

He is a shy individual who is small in stature and

likes to read and write poetry.

Is he a professor of

psychology or a professor of Chinese studies?

Nisbett and

Ross (1980) suggest most people will answer "Chinese
studies" since the data presented seem more in character, or
representative, of someone in Chinese studies.

If one
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considers this thought experiment in light of the actual
numbers of professors in each field a very different answer
is suggested.

Most universities have relatively larger

psychology departments, and simple base rates, the only real
objective criteria, would predict he was a psychologist.
Taylor and Crocker (1981) approach representativeness
in a different manner, suggesting a relationship between the
degree of representation and schemas.

Their position holds

that before representativeness can be judged, a schema must
be present to be used as a standard.

Thus, in the above

example, before deciding which field the professor is in,
we must examine schemas for "Chinese studies professors"
and "psychology professors."
based on resemblance, be made.

Only then can our decision,
Unfortunately, research into

representativeness, as was the case with schema research,
fails to specify any precise guidelines by which to evaluate
the degree of representativeness (Nisbett & Ross 1980) .
Thus researchers cannot currently make formal specifications
of the "degree" of representativeness or whether or not a
schema must be present as a standard of comparison and this
heuristic can only be used as an explanatory construct.
The representativeness heuristic may be involved in
subjects' reports of the sources of self-knowledge.

For

example, does social comparison seem representative of dif
ferent personality traits than the other sources?

Self-

observation seems more representative of values regarded
positively in this country such as independence, individuality

30
or self-reliance while social comparison seems representa
tive of less-positively valued attributes (Schoeneman 1981).
As the arguments for the present study are developed such a
role for representativeness will be predicted; that some
sources are representative of more socially approved traits
than others .
Availability
Like representativeness, the availability heuristic is
an informal decision making strategy.

Tversky and Kahneman

define availability in the following manner:

"People

assess the frequency of a class or the probability of an
event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can
be brought to mind" (1974, p. 1127).

They go on to say that

availability based decisions seem to be a function of any
of the following factors;

the differential retrievability

of examples, the efficiency of memory search set, the dif
ferential imaginability, of instances or through illusory
correlation.

In the following discussion, each of these

types of availability bias will be examined and examples of
each will be given.

Most of these examples are hypothetical

ones; however, they are modeled quite closely on the exten
sive work of Tversky and Kahneman (see Kahneman, Slovic, &
Tversky 1982 for an excellent compilation of this work and
other research into heuristics and judgment order uncer
tainty) .
The first type of availability effects to be examined
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will be those based on the retrievability of examples.

In

this case estimates of the size of a class of events or the
subjective probability of an event's occurrence are based
on the ease of recall.

A class will appear larger if its

examples are easier to retrieve than another class of the
'
same size with harder to retrieve examples.

Tversky and

Kahneman (1973) illustrated tins.in a study in which lists
with equal numbers of men and women were presented to sub
jects.

The "availability" manipulation consisted of

including either several famous men's or women's names on
these lists.

They found that the sex with the well known,

and more available, examples was consistently estimated as
being the longer list.
Another way of approaching the retrievability of
examples is by use of the "vividness" criteria.

That is,

vivid or concrete examples are more available and carry more
decision making weight than pallid information such as
statistical base rates.
having a car wreck.

Consider the effects of almost

The subsequent liklihood of having an

accident has not changed but the subjective liklihood has
greatly increased and the driver is quite likely to drive
slower and with greater caution for some time to come. This
heuristic is also made use of by advertisers who try to sell
products based not on empirical product performance but use
much more vivid testimonials in which a person tells us "I
know product X . . . .

"

This strategy seems to work too

because people will often overlook truly "informative"
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information to make use of less informative but more vivid
and interesting data.
A second type of availability use is based on the
efficiency of memory search set.

Again an example from

Tversky and Kahneman's (1982) will be used to illustrate
availability principles.

Subjects were asked "Are there

more words which begin with the letter R or have R as the
third letter?"

Tversky and Kahneman's subjects gave the

former answer more often while the latter one is the correct
answer; there are more words with R in the thix*d position.
The basis of these findings seems to be that it is easier to
recall words beginning with R (such as ripe, read or relax)
than words with R as, the third letter (such as error, street,
or care).
problem.

By way of analogy consider the following library
Imagine the relative difficulty of finding books

about "Australia" compared to finding books by Australian
authors.

Nisbett and Ross (1980) suggest the greater ease

in finding books about Australia tells us little about the
library's holdings but a great deal about its cataloging
system.

Similarly, Tversky and Kahneman's example with the

letter R tells us more about the memory search process than
actual frequencies of words.
Another factor which, affects availability is the dif
ferential imaginability of instances.

Consider a question

such as "How many psychologists are there in North Dakota?"
A graduate student or professor of psychology might over
estimate the number in the state.

After all, consider the
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high number of such a person's friends and acquaintances who
are psychologists and the low number of non-psychologists
known.

A rancher in western North Dakota would probably

answer with a much lower estimate since he or she may know
of no psychologists, most of his or her friends are probably
other ranchers.

Thus, the number of examples of a class are

often used to assess the size of that class.

This illus

trates another aspect of the availability heuristic, the
non-random "sample" of events on which our availability
decisions are based.

The rancher and the professor although

they live in the same state are likely to have experienced
very different aspects of the state yet both may feel they
are typical North Dakotans.

Unless they take the non

randomness of their experiences into account, i.e., thinking
"Most of my friends are psychologists but that's because
I'm here at UND; if I were in mother part of the state I
would see fewer psychologists," estimates based on availa
bility are likely

:o

be. iu error.

,-

The fourth and final factor which Tverskv and Kahneman
(1974) suggest may account for the availability heuristic
is illusory correlation.

Illusory correlation will be dis

cussed in more detail than the other causes of availability
because of its importance to the present study and the
widespread attention it has received outside of Tversky and
Kahneman's investigations.
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Illusory Correlation
Since this topic was first investigated it has been
called by many names:

correlational bias, illusory correla

tion, perceived co-occurrence or simply errors in.detecting
covariation (Tversky & Kahneman 1974, Nisbett & Ross 1980;
Taylor & Crocker 1981).

All of these labels seem to be

describing similar phenomena so for simplicity's sake the
term illusory correlation will be used in the present
discussion.

Illusory correlation is a condition in which

events or stimuli are perceived to co-vary although empiri
cal studies show (or would likely show) no such relation
ships.

More simply put, they are relationships between

stimuli which "ought” to exist yet do not (Jennings, Amabi?a
& Ross 1982).
Several of the studies presented in earlier sections
demonstrating schemas and heuristics can be re-interpreted
using the concept of illusory correlation.
Studies such as Miyamoto and Dornbush (1956), Koltov
(1962), Berman and Kenney (1976) and even Asch (1946) all
demonstrate illusory correlations between personality
traits.

For example, Miyamoto and Dornbush found that I.Q.

and physical attractiveness were perceived to correlate.
There is no actual correlation, of course, between these
attributes yet subjects consistently report one.

Similarly

Asch's findings of implicit "going together" of traits is
an example of subjects' beliefs in nonexistent relation
ships.

Some authors (Jennings, Amabile & Ross 1982) have
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also noted that Thorndike’s (1920) notion of the halo effect
is also an example of illusory correlation because this
effect found that good traits (or items) tend to be
associated with good traits (or items) and negative ones
with negative ones.
Perhaps the most famous studies in illusory correla
tional bias were the ones done by the Chapmans (Chapman &
Chapman 1967, 1969).

They found that, certain psychometric

indicators used by clinicians were erroneous and that lay
people, when asked to .interpret ’’test data,” generated and
believed similar indicators to be true.

It seems that

subjects were making a "correlational analysis” where seman
tic relationships were confused and possibly interchanged
with real relationships (Golding & Rorer 1972).

The

Chapmans found that emphasis on the eyes o n 'the Draw-aPerson Test led subjects to diagnosis "patients” as being
suspicious.

There is no empirical relationship between

this indicator and suspiciousness but there is some face
validity to such a sign.

Perhaps large eyes seem repre

sentative of suspicious people or people equate
suspiciousness with "prying eyes” making eyes more available.
Several writers have proposed that corr'elat ion, in
general, is a concept few understand.

Schweder notes that

while most people have a correct intuitive perception of
concepts such as class inclusion, antonymy, synonymy, partwhole, and temporality, statistical terms such as
correlation are non-intuitive ones for which foi'mal training
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is needed in order to be understood (Schweder 1977;
Smedslund 1963).

Jenkins and Ward (1965) similarly propose

that people misunderstand contingency and confuse it with
desired outcome.
Schweder, in his 1977 discussion of correlation in
personality judgments, presents a unique conceptual approach
to this issue.

His basic hypothesis sounds quite similar to

those of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and Golding and Rorer
(1972) ; we rely on likeness and not likelihood in making
"correlation” estimates.

Given that correlation is a non-

.intuitive concept, he believes that resemblance is used as
a fundamental conceptual device by both primitive and
advanced cultures and often results in "magical thinking."
He defines this magical thinking in the following manner."magical thinking (confusing propositions about the world
with propositions about the language) is an expression of
a universal disinclination of normal adults to draw corre
lational lessons from their experience" (1977, p. 647).
Taylor and Crocker (1981) suggest that schemas may
have a twofold impact on illusory correlation:

first,

schemas may influence the type of evidence use in assessing
co-occurrence, and secondly schemas may make some evidence
more available and hence over-utilized in making judgments.
It was noted earlier that schemas tend to facilitate memory
searches for schema-consistent information while ignoring
inconsistent or irrelevant information (Allport & Postman
1947; Jenkins & Ward 1965; Snyder & Swann 1978; Crocker &
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Taylor note 6).

Such biased recall effectively "loads the

dice" since our co-variation assessment is made against
confirming instances, and this suggests the second way that
schemas are implicated in illusory correlation:
those schema-consistent examples more available.

they make
As Taylor

and Crocker suggest "if one can recall more schema-consist
ent (such as extraverted salesman), than schema-inconsistent
(introverted salesman)., or irrelevant (dependent salesman)
instances than schema-consistent instances should be over
represented in judgments of covariation" (1981, p. 122).
Thus, illusory correlations seem to involve schemas
and both the availability and representativeness heuristic.
This produces a confusing state of affairs because differ
ent writers propose different explanatory roles for these
three tools of social judgment in explaining illusory
correlation.

Tversky and Kahneman (1974) originally

subsumed illusory correlation under the concept of the
availability heuristic.

The logic here was that the

strength of associative bonds was responsible for the per
ceived correlation.

Conversely Jennings, Amnbile and Ross

(1982) suggest representativeness as the key element under
lying illusory correlation while Taylor and Crocker (1981)
propose schemas and representativeness as being responsible
for illusory correlation.

Indeed, it seems likely that any

or all of these tools of social judgment may serve a
function in this concept and future research seems to be
the only solution to the current state of affairs.
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While it is regrettable that illusory correlation is
not better understood, it will still be an important concept
in the present study.

Before beginning the discussion of

the study, however, one last area of literature will be
reviewed:

the effects of people's tools of social judgment

on perceptions of themselves and others.
Social Judgment, Self-Presentation
and Self-Projection
In this section schematic processing and attributional
biases such as Illusory correlation will be examined in
light of self-presentation theory.

So far much of the

groundwork for the present study has been set; showing how7
global judgmental strategies such as schemas and heuristics
are often used inappropriately in evaluating situations and
people.

One key factor which has only been alluded to is

how and why might one schema seem preferable or better than
another. ■ In this section that question will be answered by
showing that, just as people have implicit personality
theories, there is also an implicit evaluative component to
these theories which may best be approached through the
self-presentation literature.
Like many topics in the social sciences, self
presentation is a very broad one encompassing many aspects
of human behavior.

This topic, which is also called

impression management, was defined by Schlenker as
the conscious or unconscious attempt to control
images that are projected in real or imagined social
interactions. When the images are self-relevant, the
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behavior is termed self-presentation. We attempt to
influence how others, real or imagined, perceive our
personality traits, abilities, intentions, behaviors,
values, physical characteristics, social character
istics, family, friends, job and possessions.
In so
doing we often influence how we see ourselves (1980,
p • 6) .
Such a definition is broader than the traditional interpre
tation of self-presentation which denotes a pragmatic,
motivated effect in which public statements are used to
protect the private self-image (Allport 1937; Heider 1958).
However, a distinction can be made between two types of
self-presentation.

Self-presentation, as we will be using

It in this study, does not refer to the overt calculated
variety which may be used to ingratiate oneself to someone.
The discussion will center on a second type which is in many
respects similar to attributional and schema bias.
Schlenker has suggested calling this form "selfprojection” to avoid the above mentioned Machiavellian con
notations and is described as "well-ingrained habitlike
responses that are triggered In particular situations and
need not involve intentional subterfuge" (1980, p. 7).

In

discussing this type of self-presentation effect Schlenker
(1980) notes that explanatory constructs such as schemas or
scripts are necessary.

Self schemas or self constructs

(Epstein 1973; Markus 1977) are thought to be used in this
case in a summary capacity which aids organization and
attention to various aspects of the self.

It is important

to reiterate here that self schemas, like other types of
schemas, are not so much dictated by reality as they are
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used to make subjective realities (dchlenker 1980).

Schemas

seem _o serve several important functions in maintaining the
self-concept.

They are important because they allow a life

time of experience to be organized in a manageable way which
also facilitates the maintenance of self-esteem (Epstein
1973).

They are also important in terms of self-presentation

since a belief that we have a certain attribute, i.e.,
independence, leads us to act in ways which express that
belief--by acting independent (Carson 1969).
Indeed, self-schemas raise the question of whether
self-presentation effects are due to public descriptions or
private perceptions.

The traditional manipulative forms of

impression management suggest that they are likely a
function of overtly managed public descriptions designed to
fulfill a purpose.

Such an overt description bias seems

less likely with the "self-projection" form.

Evidence to

date is mixed with some studies finding evidence for biased
private perceptions (Miller 1976; Sicoly & Ross 1977; Garn
a Rosenburg 1981; Greenberg, Pyszczynski & Solomon 1982; and
Reiss, Rosenfeld, Medburg & Tedeschi 1981) while others find
evidence for biased public descriptions (Ajzen & Fishbein
1975. Miller & Ross 1975, Brewer 1977).

A definitive answer

is currently eluding self-presentation researchers although
evidence does seem to be very suggestive that biased private
perceptions are involved (Schlenkex* 1980) .
In a related vein researchers are reporting tendencies
for schemas (and self-schemas) to be used in congruence with
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stereotypic and other culturally shared beliefs (Rothbart,
Evans & Fulero 1979; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff « Rodemann 1978).
Langer (1978) suggests that schemas may be acquired, at
either conscious or unconscious levels, and used without the
benefit of critical or evaluative judgments.

For example

consider such culturally shared schemas as "fat people are
jolly," "blondes have more fun" or scripts such as the
obligatory smile when the boss tells a tired old joke
(Schlenker 1980) .

These are probably schemas or stereotypes

which most people are aware of and which may influence their
behavior.

Thus, it seems that schemas and schematic-based

stereotypes can, at times, act like culturally shared norms
to which there is implicit agreement.
Additional evidence for cognitive bias in self
presentation was found by jellison and Green (1981).

They

propose the existence of a "norm of internality” which
stresses greater value on internal, as opposed to external,
attributions.

They found that people implicitly judged

othei*s by this norm, believed themselves to be "more inter
nal" than others and also described themselves as being
"more internal" than others when asked to make a good
impression.

Thus, jellison and Green argued that there is

an implicit "goodness" to internal attributions used in
both judgment of others and presentation of the self.

This

finding is of great interest in explaining subjects’ reports
of the sources of self-knowledge since there is one source,
self-observation, which is more "internal" than the other
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sources.

Based on Jellison and Green's findings, it can be

argued that self-observation's popularity among subjects
(Schoeneman 1981) may be due to "approval" based on the
norm of internality.
It may well be that subject's reports of the sources
of self-knowledge are a function of biased self-perceptions.
Schoeneman (1981) reports that when asked to respond under
differing instructional sets, reports are similar under the
"truthful" and "best light" conditions and "worst light" and
"other student" conditions.

Although his data do not

address the direction of the relationship, they do suggest
self-presentational implications.

A different set of

studies by Schoeneman (1981) suggests that overt forms of
impression management may not be operating here since cor
relations with the social desirability scale were generally
weak or nonsignificant.
Statement of the Problem
The present study seeks to investigate and interpret
subjects' reports of the sources of self-knowledge in light
of the information presented about self-projection and the
tools of social judgment.

The basic tenet of this study is

that subjects' reports are based on an implicit evaluation
bias similar to Schlenkers'

(1980) "self-projection"

•hypothesis and Jellison and Green's (1981) "norm of inter
nality."

It is predicted that people have intuitive notions

about the sources of self-knowledge.

These notions are
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expected to be. very general and diffuse resulting in the
overall effect that self-observation is seen as a better
source than comparison and self-observers are perceived as
better people than comparers.

Such a hypothesis is very

similar to Jellison and Green's (1981) where internal
attributors received more social approval than did external
attributors.
Although there is no evidence to date that, any of the
sources of self-knowledge are organized schematically, it
seems plausible that they may be organized in schematiclike fashion.

For example, people may have an intuitive

notion and evaluation of the process of self-observation
(script) and of self-observers (schemas).

This is, in many

ways, just a restatement of Schoeneman's (1981) hypothesis
that self-observation may be associated with independence
and with individualism.

Indeed, his ideas suggest that at

the very least sources may be "representative" of different
traits and dispositions carrying evaluation connotations.
The question of whether or not the sources are organized
"schematically" or are merely ''representative” of traits is
irrelevant at this point..

Similar predictions of source

associations with evaluative concepts can be made with
either of these tools of social judgment.

Perhaps it might

be best to consider this association an illusory correlation
(an area it may be recalled in which heuristic and schematic
use is also indistinguishable) between the various sources
and a good-bad evaluative dimension.

This would be an

illusory correlation since there is no reason to believe
that sources like self-observation actually are used by
more independent, individualistic persons or that social
comparison is used by persons who are uncertain or have
other unfavorable characteristics.
The data reported in Schoeneman's "imagined conditions"
study (1981) would seem to support an illusory correlation
hypothesis.

Recall that self-observation was favored in

the "best light" and "truthful and honest" conditions while
comparison was favored in the "worst light" and "as others
y

w’ould" conditions.

This clearly indicates a relationship

in which self-observation is seen as "good" while social
comparison is seen as "bad."

Indeed, it may be that

Schoeneman's (1981) results are a function of students
responding based on stereotypes or "schemas" representative
of the sources.
One issue which Schoeneman's (1981) study raises is why
feedback remains constant throughout the instructional
changes.

To address this issue, several characteristics of

feedback are important.

Self-observation and social compari

son both require intentionally initiated efforts from the
self-perceiver and tell us that he or she wants to learn
something.

In contrast feedback does not always require

this effort, or motivation to learn because this source
actually involves two subtypes:
feedback.

solicited and unsolicited

These two types were not separated in Schoeneman's

early work, but it may be important to separate them in the
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present study because this dimension will tell us something
about the person's motivation to learn.

In other words,

subjective effort may be important since it tells subjects
that someone wants to know something about him or herself.
The manner in which learning is attempted may then be
reflective on the person.

Users of self-observation seem

more self-reliant, and perhaps more internal in Jellison
and Green's (1981) approach.

In contrast users of solicited

feedback or comparison seem less self-reliant or even
uncertain, and more external in Jellison and Green's terms.
Subjects' perceptions of Unsolicited feedback are harder
to predict.

It may be that without subjective effort to

give the learned information more personal relevance, it
would be viewed in a neutral manner; i.e., the person did
not want or need to know so it does not matter anyway.
However, it seems more likely that to a person receiving
feedback without soliciting it the social situation will
seem relatively out of control.

Perhaps information learned

via unsolicited feedback may appear to be either a compliment or an insult depending on what is learned.
The present study investigated the schema availability
hypotheses by, in essence, reversing the paradigm used in
earlier studies (Schoeneman 1981; Schoeneman, Tabor & Nash
Note 2; Nash & Schoeneman Note 1).

Instead of having sub

jects generate frequencies of the sources or indicate which
source best fits with instructional sets, the experimental
task was to rate descriptions of people who learn about

themselves via the different sources.

This was accomplished

by giving subjects four short stories consisting of a brief
action paragraph followed by a source of self-knowledge
ending in which one of the characters learns something about
him or herself via a given source.

This paradigm allowed

differentiation of the sources of self-knowledge based on
ratings such as good-bad, active-passive and the like.
Although subjects were asked to rate the self-learner, it
is assumed that they were actually rating a stereotyped
impression of the self-learner which will be congruent with
their individual source of self-knowledge schemas.

This

paradigm allowed testing of predictions made based on the
"intuitive" properties of the sources.
Self-observation was expected to be rated as generally
the best source.

This rating is predicted to be quite

diffuse and is expected to result in higher ratings on such
unrelated dimensions as "have for a friend" or "similar" or
"admirable.”

Social comparison is expected to be at the

opposite end of the evaluative spectrum and overall to cast
a negative light upon its users.

Solicited feedback is

expected to fall in the middle range between self-observa
tion and social, comparison.

Depending on the valence of

what is learned with unsolicited feedback it may appear to
be either a compliment or an insult to the recipient.

If

this is the case, then the resulting ratings may be more
extreme than either self-observation or social comparison.
A fifth, condition with no source, of self-knowledge ending,

.in which the character learns nothing, was also included as
as control condition allowing an examination of subjects'
impressions of the first part of the story.

This condition

is predicted to be a neutral one and as such to not produce
extreme ratings.
In this study several other dimensions were also exam
ined:

the effects of the story character's sex, subject

sex, learning positive or negative traits and an examination
of relationships between responses and some personality
measures.
The variable of story character and subject sex is
important to the study of the sources of self-knowledge
since earlier studies (Schoeneman 1981, Nash & Schoeneman
Note 1) suggest a sex difference for reports of social com
parison.

These studies, which used the'same methodological

design, both found a tendency for males to report using
comparison approximately twice as often as females.

Thus,

it may be that males find this source more acceptable, in
which case in the present study male subjects may rate
comparison ''better” than do female subjects.

It was also

of interest to see if male subjects would rate it as being
more acceptable only for male story characters or for both
sexes of characters.

Indeed, it was possible to see if

either, or both, male or female subjects report any rela
tionship between their sex, story character sex and sources
in general.
Similarly, the effects of trait valence were explored
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by presenting stories containing negative and positive
triats.

One would expect that, in general, positive traits

would produce more positive ratings.

This variable also

.could reveal whether or not any sources were viewed differ
ently when negative traits are learned.

It is expected that

private source ratings, such as those of self-observation
and comparison may be less affected by negative traits than
ratings of public sources like feedback.

Results from this

study also allowed for an examination for any effects
between trait, subject sex arid character sex.
Subjects in the experimental conditions, those with a
source of self-knowledge ending, were also given a chance to
rate the actual source of self-knowledge for its accuracy,
believability and reliability.

These variables were

included as exploratory measures; however some limited pre
dictions can be made.

The norm of internality (Jellison &

Green 1981) suggests that private internal sources such as
self-observation would be rated better than public external
sources like feedback and social comparison.

Indeed, feed

back and comparison's predicted "negative schematic"
organization may be strong enough to bias subjects'
perceptions of these sources.

The ratings of the source,

like the ratings of the self-learner, were expected to be
i

global and it is likely that all three variables will be
seen as implicitly going together.
A final aspect of this study looked for any relation
ships between personality traits and subjects' reports of
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the sources of self-knowledge.

The traits studied were:

self-consciousness (Feningstein, Scheier & Buss 1975), selfmonitoring (Snyder 1974), social desirability (Crowne &
Marlowe 1964), and both trait and state anxiety (Spielberger,
Gorsuch & Lushene 1968).
The self-consciousness scale (Feninstpin et al. 1975)
was designed to assess individual differences in three
aspects of self-consciousness:

private s^lf-consciousness,

public self-consciousness and social anxiety.

The concepts

of private and public self-consciousness are traits analogous
to the states of private and public self-awareness discussed’
earlier in relation to Nash and Schoeneman's work (Note 1).
Thus, private self-consciousness represents a tendency to
spend more time attending to internal thoughts and feelings,
i.e., "I think about so and so a lot.” ' Public selfconsciousness is a tendency to focus attention on how one
is presented and how this effects others ,
lot about how others see me.”
scale is social anxiety.

J

.e ., ”1 think a

The third measure on this

This was defined as a measure of

discomfort in social situations, i.e., ”1 get nervous at
large parties.”
Snyder's self-monitoring scale is a self-report instru
ment designed to assess individual differences in the
ability to "observe and control expressive behavior and
self-presentation” (1974, p. 536).

According to this scale

a high self-monitorer would be someone aware of how
appropriate his or her self-presentation is in a given
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setting and would be likely to change his or her behavior
to manipulate others' reactions.

This can be contrasted

with the low self-monitoring person who has very little con
cern for his or her self-presentation or the expressions of
others.

This individual would be more likely to govern

behavior as a function of internal attitudes and not social
reactions or pressure.
The state-trait anxiety inventory (Spielberger et al.
1968) is a self-report measure consisting of two scales.
The state anxiety scale asks subjects to report how they
feel "at this moment."

It assesses "a transient emotional

state or condition of the human organism that is character
ized by subjective consciously perceived feelings of tension
and apprehension" (Spielberger et al. 1968, p. 3).

By way

of contrast, the trait measure asks for a report of how
subjects generally feel.
The last scale included in this study is the MarloweCrowne Social Desirability scale (Crowne & Marlowe 1964).
This scale measures the degree to which a person agrees to
statements which are "'good' culturally sanctioned things to
say about oneself: and second, they are probably unture of
most people" (Crowne 4 Marlowe 1964, p. 21).

This scale is

of particular interest since it i^as included in Schoeneman's
(1981) original study.

He found modest, yet significant,

correlations between this scale and percent mentions of
social comparison and mean rankings of feedback.

Thus it

was of interest to attempt to replicate these results and to

51
explore fc~ any relationship between social desirability and
the measures in the current study.
In summary, the hypotheses tested in this study were:
that subjects' reports of the sourees of self-knowledge are
a function of an implicit good-bad evaluation of the sources
and a replication of the ranking portion of Schoeneman's
study (1981) .

Also included in this study were an explora

tion of other independent variables (i.e., subject sex,
character sex, and trait valance) as well as the relation
ships between several traits (i.e., anxiety, selfconsciousness, self-monitoring and social desirability) and
the reports of the sources of self-knowledge.

CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Subj ects
Subjects for this study were recruited from the
University of North Dakota's Introductory and Developmental
Psychology subject pool.

A total of 200 subjects, 100 male

and 100 female, was tested in groups of fewer than 30.
Test materials were distributed so that all experimental
conditions were as equally represented as possible during
each session.
Procedure
Subjects were told they were participating in a "story
rating study" and were asked to read four stories and
complete several questions and ratings about each story.
Each subject was given two packets of experimental materials.
The first packet contained four different stories each
constructed in the same format, an introductory "action”
paragraph consisting of 2 same sex friends either having a
pizza, going fishing, watching TV or walking back from
class, and a source of self-knowledge ending paragraph (see
Appendix A for the experimental stories).

These stories had

been studied in an earlier investigation to determine if the
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format of the stories plus a source of self-knowledge ending
produced a character rating effect and also allowed examina
tion of subjects’ impressions of the stories.

Based on the

pilot data,'which is not included in the present report, it
was found that the different source of self-knowledge
endings did influence the character ratings.
Each packet of four stories always had the same type of
ending; i.e., four self-observation, unsolicited feedback,
solicited feedback, social comparison or no source endings.
Thus, source of self-knowledge was a between subjects condi
tion.

Each set of four stories also contained two stories

with male characters, two with female characters, two with
’'positive" traits and two with "negative" traits.
Positive and negative trait words were taken from a
subset of 200 high meaningfulness words from Anderson's
(1968) table of likableness ratings of 555 words.

Positive

or negative was somewhat arbitrarily defined as being within
a

±

.AO to -60 Z score range.

The positive traits, with Z

scores in parentheses were "serious" (+ 0.56) and "idealis
tic" (+ 0.59), negative traits were "timid" (-0.42) and
"sarcastic" (-0.50).

Because the traits were matched on

likableness ratings, it was possible to assume, for example,
that the two positive traits were conceptually equal.

The

same assumption also holds for the negative traits allowing
"timid” and "sarcastic" to both be seen as producing
equivalent results.
Trait and story character sex were counterbalanced so
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Chat each story stem appears with equal frequency with each
character sex and trait (see Table 2).

Additionally, presen

tation order was counterbalanced so each story was equally
represented in each serial order.
The second packet contained the following scales, SelfMonitoring (Snyder 1974) , State-Trait Anxiety (Spielberger
et al. 1968), Self-Consciousness scale (Fenigstein, Scheier
& Buss 1975) and Social Desirability (Crowne & Marlowe
1964).
Thus, the procedure for each subject was as follows:
1)

Instructions were given to the subjects to first

complete the packet containing •the stories and then to
complete the set of questionnaires.

Specific instructions

were given only to explain to subjects how to place an
identification number on some sheets and to remind them of
confidentiality policies.

Subjects were then reminded to

begin with the packet containing the stories which were
described as a set of short stories followed by some
questions and ratings.

They were instructed to read each

story carefully and not to turn back to them while answering
test items.
2)

Read the first story.

3)

Complete a manipulation check to determine that

subjects had read and understood the story.

This check'

consisted of five questions for subjects in the selfobservation, solicited and unsolicited feedback and social
comparison conditions and the first two questions for those

TABLE 2
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PRESENTATION ORDER OF STORIES
Character Sex
•

■

••

••'

Female

Male

’

Experimental
Condition*

+ Trait
(Idealistic)

SelfObservation

1**
2
3
4

Unsolicited
Feedback

1
2
3
4

Solicited
Feedback

1
2
3
4

:

- Trait
(Sarcastic)

+ Trait
(Serious)

- Trait
(Timid)

2
3
4
1

3
4
1
2

4
1
2
3

1

Social
Comparison

No
Source

2
3
4
1
2
3
4

*Experimental Condition is a between subjects variable,
all others are within subjects variables.
**Numbers 1-4 represent the story sterns used in each
condition. The 'same pattern was used in all between subject
conditions.
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in the no source ending condition.

The questions used were:

1) What activity were the people in this story doing?,
2) Did someone learn something about him/herself in this
story?, 3) Who learned something about him/herself in this
story?, 4) What did he/she learn about him/herself?, 5) How
did he/she learn it?

All subjects were able to correctly

complete these questions, thus no subjects' data was
excluded from analysis.
4)

Subjects rated the character who learned something

(the character's name was provided in the'no source condi
tion) on the following dimensions:

good, optimistic,

strong, dominant, active, dynamic, admirable, friendly,
likable, nice, popular, similar, enjoy the person's company,
have for a friend, desire to look good, curious, emotionally
healthy, intelligent, has control over own life (see Table
3) .

Subjects then rated the sources of self knowledge used

(those questions were not given in the no source condition)
for its accuracy, believability and reliability (see Table
4) .
5)

Subjects went through steps 2 to 4 for each of the

remaining 3 stories.
6)

Subjects completed a series of 10 ranking proce

dures developed by Schoeneman (1981) using the format:
I have come to know I am a ( n ) ______ ____person through
_.__ _ comparing my .actions and opinions with those of
other people
______ noticing the direct and indirect feedback that
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TABLE 3
RATING DIMENSIONS FOR STORY CHARACTERS
1)

good-bad*

2)

optimistic-pessimistic*

3)

strong-weak**

A)

dominant-submissive**

5)

active-passive***

6)

dynamic-static***

7)

admirable-not. admirable

8)

friendly-unfriendly

9)

likable-uniikable

10)

nice-mean

11)

popular-unpopular

12)

similar-dissimilar

13)

enjoy the person's company--not enjoy the person's
company

14)

have for a friend--not have for a friend

15)

desires to look good-~does not desire to look good

16)

curious--not curious

17)

emotionally healthy--emotionally unhealthy

18)

intelligent--unintelligent

19)

has control over own life--does not/others control own
life

*Iteras making up the evaluative scale of the semantic
differential.
**Iterns making up the potency scale of the semantic
differential.
***Iterns making up the activity scale of the semantic
differential.
Note items 1-6 taken from Friedman and Gladden (196A)
and items 7-14 modified from Jellison and Green (1981) .

others give to me and their reactions to
me
______ observing my own actions, thoughts and feelings
and the situations in which they occur.
Each choice was randomly rotated in position across the 10
items.

The rankings used on them were 1 = most important,

2 = second in importance, 3 ~ third in importance, and N =
not applicable, irrelevant, etc.
ranking portion were:

The traits used in the

easy going, quiet, sarcastic, timid,

versatile, serious, forgetful, mature, friendly, and
idealistic.
7)

Subjects completed the following questionnaires:

Self-Consciousness Scale, State-Trait Anxiety Scale, SelfMonitoring Scale and Social Desirability Scale.
TABLE 4

.

RATING DIMENSIONS FOR THE SOURCES OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE*
1.
2

.

3.

accurate-inaccurate
believable-unbelievable
reliable-unreliable

*These ratings were not given to subjects in the "no
source of self-knowledge" ending condition.
Dependent Variables
The variables listed in Tables 3 and 4 were all rated
on 1 to 10 scales.

Thus, dependent variables were simply

the number assigned to each by the subject.

Item pairs
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comprising the semantic differential (Friedman & Gladden
1964) were averaged for the evaluative-, potency and activity
ratings.

These dependent variables were each analysed

separately using a 4 factor ANOVA design, i.e., "trait
valence" by "character sex" by "subject sex" by "source of
self-knowledge condition."
The dependent variables from Schoeneman's (1981) rank
ing procedure are simply mean rankings for each source.

The

number of "N" responses was summed as a separate variable.
As part of this ranking procedure the four traits used
in the experimental stories were included.

Thus mean rank

ings and sum of N responses were calculated for i) all 10
traits, ii) the 4 experimental traits, iii) the 6 nonexperimental traits.

The ANOVA procedure used in this

analysis was a 3 factor design; "source of self-knowledge
condition" by "subject sex" by "number of traits" (4 ti'ait
group vs. 6 trait group).

A separate ANOVA was computed

for each of the following 6 variables:

mean rank of self

observation, feedback, and social comparison and the number
of times "not applicable" was used for self-observation,
feedback and social comparison.

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
The results of this study are composed of three kinds
of measures.-

(1) the ratings of the self-learner and (in

all but the no source ending condition) the source he or
■A

she used,

'

(2) a set of ranking variables analogous to those

used by Schoeneman (1981) arid Nash and Schoeneman (Note 1) ,
and (3) analysis of the above variables in light of several
personality trait and response set measures.
groups was analyzed in a similar manner.

Each of these

A repeated

measures analysis of variance 'was computed for each depend
ent variable with, the traditional alpha level of .05 used
as the criterion for statistical significance.

The Newman-

Keuls procedure was used on all significant main effects
and interactions to determine which group means were
different.
Story Character and
Source Ratings
The analysis of mrimary importance to this study in
volved the story character and source of self-knowledge
rating variables.

As Table 5 clearly demonstrates, these

variables produced a large number of significant main
effects and interactions'.

In presenting these results each
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TABLE 5
F VALUES FOR SIGNIFICANT CHARACTER AND SOURCE RATINGS
Significant Effects3

Dependent
Variable
Accurate
Believable
Reliable
Similar
Enjoy the
Person’s
Company
Admirable
Emotionally
Healthy
Desires to
Look Good
Friendly
Likable
Nice
Have for a
Friend
Evaluative
Scale
Activity
Scale
Potency
Scale
Curious
Controls
Own Life
Intelligent
Popular

Source
Condition

Trait Character
Valence
Sex

4.64*

5.09
5.09
6.44*
11.47*

3.26
2.49

6.91
37.46**

2.63

39.39**

Subject
Sex

Trait
Trait
Valence Valence by
by Source Character
Sex
Condition

2.66
2.74

11.86*
11.46*
10.35*

6.66*

13.01*

9.65*

18.70**

9.04

3.15*
9.71*
8.12*
24.55**

4.91
5.69*

7.09*
5.14*

5.79*

71.63**

49.34**

10.09**

5.17*

87.76**
8.45*

87.76**

7.10**

2.52

57.41**
15.43**
16.61**

39.93**
•

3.32*
17.18*
*

aNote all listed F values significant at .05 level.
*p < .01.
**p < .0001.

Trait
Valence by
Character
Sex by
Source
Condition

5.31

10.78*

10.46**

Character
Trait
Sex by
Valence by
Subject Sex Character
by Source
Sex by
Condition Subject Sex

3.63*

2.53

35.19**
4.58*

6.4o**
2.56

11.92*

2.47
2.70
3.79
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variable is discussed individually to allow an examination
and integration of each variable's significant effects.

As

much as possible the individual variables are grouped with
other variables that produced similar levels of effects,
i.e., main effects, second or third order interactions.
Following this presentation is an attempt to summarize and
reiterate the main conclusions from these results.
Results from the sources of self-knowledge ratings
indicate that all sources are more "accurate" (F [1,. 148] =
5.09, p < .0255), "believable" (F [1, 148] =3.07, p <
.0255) and "reliable" (F Cl, 148] = 6.44, p < .0122) when
positive as opposed to. negative traits are learned (see
Table 6).

'
TABLE 6

TRAIT VALENCE RATINGS FOR ACCURATE, BELIEVABLE AND RELIABLE
Variable Name
Trait
Valence

Accurate

Believable

Reliable

Positive

4.9 4a

4.55

5.48

Negative

5.42

4.91

5.84

‘'Lower means are more "accurate" etc.
Analysis of the variable "similar" also indicates a
significant main effect for trait valence (F [1, 186] =
11.47, p < .0009) in which the use of positive traits
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results in a rating of greater "similarity."

A significant

main effect was also found in the source of self-knowledge
condition (F [1, 186] - 4.64, p < .0014).

Newman Keuls’

post-hoc analysis indicates that the no source of selfknowledge ending condition resulted in a rating of greater
"similarity" than did the unsolicited feedback condition;
i .e ., the two source conditions at either end of a continuum
(see Table 7).
TABLE 7
TRAIT VALENCE BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE CONDITION
MEANS FOR RATINGS OF SIMILAR
Condition Name

Trait
Valence

Unsolicited
SelfObserva tion Feedback

Positive

4.23a

Negative

4.79

.

Social
Solicited com
Feedback parison

No
Ending

4.93

4.63

4.69

3.86

5.38

4.71

4.83

4.29

aLower means are more "similar."
Results from the variable "enjoy the person's company"
also produced a significant main effect for trait valence
(F [1, 185] - 6.91, p < .0093), subject sex (F [1, 185] 3.31, p < .0224), and the source of self-knowledge condition
(F [1, 185] - 3.26, p < ,0131).

The trait valence effect

showed that positive traits produce a rating of greater
"enjoyment of the person's company" than did negative
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traits.

Post hoc analyses of the source of self-knowledge

effects show that characters using self-observation and
social comparison are more ’’enjoyable" than those using
unsolicited feedback (see Table 8).

Subject sex analysis

show female subjects rate characters more "enjoyable" than
did male subjects (3.55 vs. 4.01).
TABLE 8
TRAIT VALENCE BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE CONDITION
MEANS FOR RATINGS OF ENJOY THE PERSON'S COMPANY
Condition Name

Trait
Valence

Unsolicited
SeLfObservation Feedback

Social
Solicited com
Feedback parison

No
Ending

Positive

3.54a

3.82

3.75

4.08

3.13

Negative

3.90

4.25

4.13

4.20

3.18

n

Lower means are more "enjoyable.”

The variable "admirable" produced significant effects
for trait valence (F [1, 186] = 37/46, p < .0001), source of
self-knowledge condition (F [1, 186] = 2.49, p < .0449) and
the interaction of trait valence by source of self-knowledge
condition (F [I, 186] = 2.66, p < .0340)

(see Table 9).

Post-hoc analysis o f :the interaction indicates that for
groups using positive traits, self-observation was rated as
more "admirable" than all other sources while negative
traits indicated the following:

The no ending condition was
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more "admirable" than unsolicited feedback and social com
parison; self-observation and solicited feedback were more
"admirable" than social comparison.

Post-hoc analysis also

indicated that self-observation, unsolicited feedback and
social comparison showed a trait valence effect, i.e.,
positive trait, use was more "admirable,” while solicited
feedback and the no ending group were not affected by the
trait valence dimension.

•

'' '

TABLE 9

• ■

•

<.

TRAIT VALENCE BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE CONDITION
MEANS FOR RATINGS OF ADMIRABLE
Condition Name

Trait
Valence

Unsolicited
SelfObservation Feedback

Social
Solicited com
Feedback parison

No
Ending

Positive

3.59a

A.30

A. A5

A. 37

A.1A

Negative

A. 70

5.10

A.77

5.38

A. 31

cl

»

Lower means are more "admirable."

The variable "emotionally healthy" produced significant
effects for trait valence (F [1, 186] ~ 39.39, p < .0001),
source of self-knowledge ending condition (F [1, 186] ~
2.63, p < .0358) and trait valence by source of selfknowledge condition (F [1, 186] = 2.7A, p < .0299) (see
Table 10).

Post-hoc examination of the two-way interaction

revealed that only the no ending condition did not produce
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a trait valence effect.

Thus, the finding that with nega

tive traits the no ending group is more healthy than all
other sources reflects the negative impact of trait valence
on the self-observation, social comparison and both feedback
conditions in contrast to the lack of such an effect on the
no ending group.

No groups of source of self-knowledge con

dition means were significantly different with the set using
positive traits.
TABLE 10
TRAIT VALENCE BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE CONDITION MEANS
FOR RATINGS OF EMOTIONALLY HEALTHY '
Condition Name

Trait
Valence

v
SelfUnsolicited
Observation Feedback

Social
Solicited com
Feedback parison

No
Ending

Positive

3.56a

4.01

3.70

3.76

3.44

Negative

4.39

4.74

4.55

4.48

3.43

£3,
*
^
‘'Lower means are more ’’emotionally healthy."
The variable "desires to look good" produced a charac
ter sex main effect in which female story characters ‘
were
rated as "desiring to look good" more than the males (F [1,
185] - 10.78, p < .0012; female mean = 3.77, male mean =
4.28).

The interaction of trait valence and source of self-

knowledge condition was also significant (F [1, 185] ~ 3.15,
p < .0155) (see Table 11).

Post-hoc analysis indicates that
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with positive traits self-observation and social comparison
are "desiring to look better” than the no ending condition
while with negative traits self-observation is seen as
"desiring to look better" than unsolicited feedback.

Com

parison of positive vs. negative groups shows that positive
traits produce the best ratings for unsolicited feedback and
social comparison, negative traits produce the best ratings
for the no ending group while self-observation and solicited
feedback are unaffected by trait valence.
TABLE 11
TRAIT VALENCE BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE CONDITION MEANS
FOR RATINGS OF DESIRES TO LOOK GOOD
Condition Name

Trait
Valence

Unsolicited
SelfObservation Feedback

Social
Solicited com
Feedback parison

No
Ending

Positive

3.65a

A. 12

A. 15

3.81

A.59

Negative

3.83

A. 59

A. 23

A .-AA

A.03

aLower means are "desiring to look bett e r ."
Analysis of "friendly" produced a main effect for trait,
valence (F [1, 185] = 11.86, p < .0007) and an interaction
of trait valence by character sex (F [1, 185] = 9.71, p <
.0021) (see Table 12).

Post-hoc interpretation of this

interaction suggests that the negative trait, male characters
are responsible for both effects; these characters are rated

less

friendly

than

all

other

character

sex

and

trait

combi

nations .

TABLE 12
TRAIT VALENCE BY CHARACTER SEX MEANS FOR
RATINGS OF FRIENDLY
Character Sex
Trait
Valence.

Male

Positive

3.32a

3.45

Negative

4.00

3.48

Female

aLower means are more "friendly."
A similar set of results was found for the variable
"likable" with significant effects for trait valence (F [1,
185] = 11.46, p < .0009), character sex (F [1, 185] - 6.66,
p < .0106) and trait valence by character sex (F [1, 185] =
8.12, p < .004,9).

Once again male characters learning nega

tive traits were rated the least well, less "likable” in
this case, than all other trait and sex combinations (see
Table 13).

A subject sex rating difference was also found

for the variable "likable" such that females reported all
characters more likable than did the male subjects (2.34
vs. 3.76, F [1, 185 3 = 4.91, p < .0279).
With

the variable "nice, male characters learning

negative traits once again suffer, being noted the least
"nice" of all other combinations of trait valence and

character sex (F [1, 186] = 24.55, p < .0001).

Note also

that the ’’negative male" group seems to be responsible for
the significant trait valence main effect (F [1, 186] ~
10.35, p < .0015) (see Table 14).

Subject sex was also

significant for this variable indicating female subjects
rate all story characters as "nicer" than did male subjects
(3.28 vs. 3.70, F [1, 186] - 5.69, p < .0180) .
TABLE 13
TRAIT VALENCE BY CHARACTER SEX MEANS FOR RATINGS OF LIKABLE
Character Sex
Trait Valence

Female

Male

Positive

3.38a

3.43

Negative

4.04

3.45

aLower means are more "likable.”
.: '

TABLE 14'
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Character Sex
Trait Valence

- Male

Female

Positive

3.35a

3.39

Negative

4.11

3.20

aLower means are "nicer."
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With results showing male characters learning negative
traits are rated the least "friendly,'’ "likable” and "nice,"
it will come as little surprise that they are also rated the
lowest on the variable "have for a friend" in the trait
valence by character sex interaction (F [1, 184] = 7.09,
p < .0084) and seem to have been responsible for the main
effects of trait valence (F [1, 184] = 13.01, p < .0004) and
character sex (F [1, 184] = 9,65, p < .0022) (see Table 15).
A nonsignificant trend was also found for women subjects to
rate characters as more the type of person to "have for a
friend" than male subjects (3.74 vs. 3.99, F [1, 184] *
2.96, p < .0872).
TABLE 15
TRAIT VALENCE BY CHARACTER SEX MEANS FOR
RATINGS OF HAVE FOR.A FRIEND
Character Sex
Trait Valence

Male

Female

Positive

3.67a

3.64

Negative

4.39

3.73

Lower means are more the type of person to "have for a
friend."
On the "evaluative" scale of the semantic differential
significant trait valence (F [1, 185] = 18.70, p < .0001),
character sex (F [1, 185] = 9.04, p < .0030) and trait
valence by character sex by subject sex (F [1, 185] ~ 5.14,
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p < .0245) effects were found (see Figure 1).

Analysis of

the interaction using the Newman Keuls procedure shows that
with positive traits female subjects rate female characters
as "better" than male characters and also that female sub
jects rate them "better" than do male subjects.

With

negative traits, however, subjects rate characters of the
same sex as "worse" than opposite sex characters.

Female

subjects also rate male characters as being "better" than do
male subjects.
FIGURE 1
TRAIT VALENCE BY CHARACTER SEX BY SUBJECT
SEX FOR EVALUATIVE RATINGS
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
Subject Sex
Ti*ait Valence

P

N

The.following abbreviations were used:
p - positive trait valence, N = negative
trait valence, M = males, F = females.
"Lower ratings are "better."
The "activity" scale of the semantic differential pro
duced the largest number of significant main effects and
interactions:

Source of self-knowledge condition (F [1,

186] = 5.79, p < .0002), trait valence (F [1, 186] = 71.63.
p < .0001), character sex (F [I, 186] = 49.34, p < .0001),

7

’ . /,
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trait valence by source condition (F [1, 186] = 10.09, p <
.0001), trait valence by character sex (F [1, 186] - 39.93,
p < .0001), character sex by subject sex by source condition
(F f1, 186] = 3.63, p < .0071) and trait valence by charac
ter sex by source condition (F [1, 186] = 2.53, p < .0421).
Post-hoc analysis of character sex by subject sex by source
.•
'•■
■
•
.
'•■
of self-knowledge condition (see Figure 2) reveals that male
,

.

•

•

•. .

.

. . . .

subjects rate female characters more "active" in the no
ending condition than in social comparison or either feed
back condition and they rate male characters more active in
the no ending and self-observation conditions than in the
FIGURE 2
CHARACTER SEX BY SUBJECT SEX BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE
CONDITION MEANS FOR RATINGS OF ACTIVITY

Char. Sex
Source Gond

SO

UFB

SFB

SO

NO

The following abbreviations were used: M = males, F =
females, SO = self-observation, UFB - unsolicited feedback,
SFB = solicited feedback, SC - social comparison, NO = no
ending.
"Lower ratings are more "active."
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unsolicited feedback condition.

Female subjects rate female

characters more active in the self-observation and the no
ending condition than in the social comparison or either
feedback condition and the no ending, self-observation,
social comparison and unsolicited feedback conditions more
active than the solicited feedback condition.

Thus it

appears that self-observation and. rather surprisingly, the
no ending condition are the most "active" modes of selfvalidation- for same sexed characters.
Analysis of trait valence, by character sex by source
of self-knowledge suggest several sets of conclusions (see
Figure 3).

First of all it may be noted that trait valence

has more impact on female characters; only in the no ending
group did this dimension fail to reach significance.

In

contrast'trait valence, reached significance only once for
male characters, in the social comparison condition.

Dif

ferent combinations of trait valence and character sex
reveal somewhat different ranking,
different sources.

of. "activity" for the

For female characters using positive

traits self-observation and social comparison are more
active than the no ending or either feedback condition.

A

similar pattern was found for males learning positive
traits; self-observation and social comparison are more
"active" than either feedback group.

With negative traits

females are the most "active" in the no ending condition
and more "active" in self-observation and unsolicited feedback than in the social comparison condition.

Once again

the results for males approximate those for females, the no
ending condition is more "active" than social comparison or
either feedback condition and self-observation is more
"active" than solicited feedback or social comparison.
FIGURE 3
TRAIT VALENCE BY CHARACTER SEX BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE
CONDITION MEANS FOR RATINGS OF ACTIVITY

Trait Valence
Source Condition

P

N
SO

P

N
UFB

?

N
SFB

P

N
SC

P

N
NO

The following abbreviations were used: P = positive
trait valence, N = negative trait valence, SO - selfobservation, UFB = unsolicited feedback, SFB = solicited
feedback, SC = social comparison, NO = no ending, M = males,
F - females. . .
Lower ratings are more "active."
The "potency" scale of the semantic differential also
produced several significant effects; source of selfknowledge condition (F [1, 185] - 5.17, p < .0006), trait
valence (F [I, 185] = 87.76, p < .0001), character sex (F
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[1, 186] = 28.77, p < .0001), trait valence by character sex
(F [1, 185] = 35.19, p < .0001), trait valence by source
condition (F [1, 185] =7.10, p < .0001) and trait valence
by character sex by source condition (F [1, 185] =6.40,
p < .0001) (see Figure 4).
FIGURE 4

•

TRAIT VALENCE. BY CHARACTER SEX BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE
CONDITION MEANS FOR RATINGS OF POTENCY
7.
7.
6.

6.
5.
5.
4,
4.
3.
Trait Valence
Source Condition

P

N
SO

P

N
UFB

P

N
SFB

P

N
SC

P

N
NO

The following abbreviations were used: P = positive
trait valence, N = negative trait valence, SO = seifobservation, UFB = unsolicited feedback, SFB = solicited
feedback, SC = social comparison, NO = no ending, M = males,
F = females.
Lower means are more "potent. '
Post hoc analysis at the highest level of intex*action
indicates the effects of character sex and trait valence are
due to the extremely poor "potency" rating given to females
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learning negative traits,

this is especially pronounced ir.

the social comparison and the no ending groups.

Other

analyses showed that males learning positive traits in the
self-observation condition are more potent than those in the
solicited feedback condition.

A very different set of dif

ferences was found when negative traits are learned; females
in the no ending and solicited feedback conditions are more
"potent" than those in the social comparison group while no
groups are significantly different for male characters.
There was also a non-significant trend for self-observation
to be the most potent source of self-knowledge, including
the no ending group, for males learning positive and nega
tive traits and females learning positive traits.
Significant effects for the variable "curious" were
found for trait valence (F [i, 185] = 8.45, p < .0041),
trait valence by character sex (F f1, 185] = 4.58, p <
.0337) and trait valence by character sex by source of selfknowledge condition (F [1, 185] - 2.56, p < .0402) (see
Figure 5).

Analysis of the three-way interaction shows that

trait valence has a significant effect on female characters
in all but the no ending condition but is never significant
for males.

These female characters learning negative traits

suffer the most in the self-observation and social compari
son conditions, in which all other trait/sex combinations
are more "curious," and in the unsolicited feedback condi
tion in which positive trait learneis are more "curious."
In this unsolicited feedback condition males learning

'••• '. ..
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FIGURE 5
TRAIT VALENCE BY CHARACTER SEX BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE
CONDITION MEANS FOR RATINGS OF CURIOUS

Trait Valence
Source Condition

SO

UFB

SFB

SC

NO

The following abbreviations were used: P = positive
trait valence, N = negative trait valence, SO = selfobservation, UFB = unsolicited feedback, SFB ~ solicited
feedback, SC = social comparison, NO = no ending, M = males,
F ~ females.
Lower means are more "curious.
negative traits are also less curious than positive female
learner groups.

Differences among the ratings of the dif

ferent sources of self-knowledge are also noted between the
different trait and sex groups.

Female characters learning

positive traits are more "curious" in the solicited feedback
than the self-observation group while the male characters
are more "curious" in the self-observation than unsolicited
feedback.

A character sex difference is also apparent when

negative traits are learned; for females the no ending group
is more "curious" than self-observation, unsolicited feed
back and social comparison, solicited feedback is also more
"curious” than social comparison.

However, for male

characters unsolicited feedback is less curious than all
four of the other ending conditions.
Another variable producing numerous significant effects
was the rating variable "has control over own life."
effects are as follows:

These

Source of self-knowledge condition

(F Cl, 185] = 10.42, p <■ .0001), trait valence (F [1, 185] =
57.41, p < .0001), trait valence by source condition (F [1,
185] = 3.32, p < .0118), trait valence by character sex (F
[1, 183] = 11.92, p < .0007) and trait valence by -character
sex by source condition (F [1, 185] = 2.47, p < .0461).
Conclusions regarding this variable from the post hoc tests,
and as evident in Figure 6, suggest that trait valence had
FIGURE 6
TRAIT VALENCE BY CHARACTER SEX BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE
CONDITION MEANS FOR RATINGS OF "CONTROLS OWN LIFE"

Trait Valence
Source Condition

SO

UFB

SFB

SC

NO

The following abbreviations were used: P = positive
trait valence, N * negative trait valence, SO = self
observation, UFB = unsolicited feedback, SFB = solicited
feedback, SC = social comparison, NO = no ending, M = males,
F - females.
aLower means are in more "control."
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an effect in all male character groups except the unsolic
ited feedback group and all female groups except the no
ending group.

For positive-female characters the no ending

group was in ’’more control” than both feedback groups and
all groups were in "more control” than the unsolicited
feedback group.

A similar set of findings was noted for

males learning positive traits; the no ending group is in
more control than social comparison and both feedback
groups, while self-observation is in more control than both
feedback groups.

For all characters learning negative

traits the no ending group is in "more control” than all
other groups.

Additionally for the male group self

observation is in "more control than unsolicited feedback.
Results for the variable "intelligent” produced three
significant effects, trait valence (F [1, 185] - 18.A3,
p < .0001), character sex (F [1, 185] = 17.18, p < .0001)
and trait valence by character sex by source of selfknowledge condition (F [1, 185] = 2.70, p < .0328).

Figure

7 illustrates the post-hoc results showing trait valence
has a significant effect for all characters in the self
observation and social comparison conditions, for males in
unsolicited feedback, and females in solicited feedback.
For characters using positive traits no source of selfknowledge condition means were significantly different.
When characters learned negative traits, the no ending con
dition was rated the most "intelligent” of all groups plus,

v
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for males,
the

all

groups

unsolicited

were

feedback

more

"intelligent"

than

those

in

group.

FIGURE

7

TRAIT VALENCE BY CHARACTER SEX BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE
CONDITION MEANS FOR RATINGS OF INTELLIGENT

Source Condition

SO

UFB

SFB

NO

SC

The following abbreviations were used: P - positive
trait valence, N = negative"trait valence, SO = selfobservation, UFB ~ unsolicited feedback, SFB =. solicited
feedback, SC = social comparison, NO = no ending, M = males,
F - females.
^ower means are more "intelligent.
The last story rating variable is "popular" which has
the following significant results:

Source of self-

knowledge condition (F [1, 186] “ 2.52, p < .0425), trait
valence (F [1, 186j =16.61, p < .001), and trait valence by
character sex by sotirce of self-knowledge condition (F [1,
186] = 3.79, p

<■

.0053) (see Figure 8).

Trait valence

effects are present for both sexes in the self-observation
and unsolicited feedback groups, for females using social
comparison and for males in the no ending groups.

Also it
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FIGURE 8
TRAIT VALENCE BY CHARACTER SEX BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE
CONDITION MEANS FOR RATINGS OF POPULAR

Trait Valence
Source Condition

SO

UFB

SFB

SC

NO

The following abbreviations were used; P ~ positive
trait valence N = negative trait valence, SO = selfobservation, UFB = unsolicited feedback, SFB = solicited
feedback, SC - social comparison, NO = no ending, M ~ males,
F ~ females.
aLower means are more "popular,”
may be noted that two non-significant trends may exist, for
males learning negative traits to be more "popular" than
males learning positive traits in the solicited feedback
group and for females learning negative traits to be more
"popular" in the no ending group than females learning
positive traits.

Across the different sources of self-

knowledge, females learning positive traits and males learn
ing negative traits produce no significant differences.
Males learning positive traits are more "popular" in the no
ending group than social comparison and the feedback groups
plus more popular in self-observation than social comparison.
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Females learning negative traits are more "popular” in the
no ending group than in all others.
Summary
Having looked at the results of each dependent varia
ble, the next task is to attempt to translate the above
discussion of statistical significance to a format which
will facilitate examination of global hypotheses such as
"trait valence" and "source of self-knowledge condition"
without losing the precision dictated by the frequent inter
action of independent variables.

Clearly, as Table 5

showed, trait valence produced the most widespread and
consistent result.

However, it would be incorrect to simpl

assume positive traits always produced lower, hence
"better," mean ratings than negative traits.

While such

main effects were found for "similar," "accurate," "believa
ble," "reliable" and "enjoy the person's company" the other
variables produced various interactions.

However when

interactions with character sex are examined, it can be
noted, in several instances, i.e., "potency," "activity,"
"admirable" and "emotionally healthy," the poor ratings of
tiegative traits seemed due to the very poor ratings given
female characters using negative traits while for
"friendly," "likable," "nice," and "have for a friend" the
poor ratings were due to the low ratings given male char
acters using negative traits.
Trait valence also produced numerous interactions with
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source of self-knowledge condition.

Examining these in

stances where trait valence differences failed to occur
reveals the most frequent condition as the no ending group,
i.e., for " a d m i rable"emotionally healthy," "popular,"
"intelligent," "curious"; for female characters "controls
own life" and for males with "potent."

Curiously the no end

ing group also produced the only "reverse" finding in which
negative traits caused characters to be seen as "desiring to
look better" than positive traits.

Other source of self-

knowledge conditions and the variables x^hich. did not produce
significant results are listed below:

1) self-observation--

potent and curious (both for males only); 2) unsolicited
feedback--desires to look, for males only the variables
potent, curious, and controls ox^n life and for females only
the variables intelligent and popular, 3) solicited feedback--admirable, for males only curious and intelligent, for
females only the variable popular, 4) social comparison-desires to look good and for males only potent and curious.
The source of self-knowledge variable presents an
equally complex picture as only two main effects are not
subsequently qualified by higher order significant results.
Thus, unsolicited feedback users are "less enjoyable
company" than self-observers and comparers and less "similar’
than all other characters.

Results of source condition by

trait valence are summarized in Table 16 and in Table 17
and 18 for source by trait valence by character sex.
Due to the large number of interactions involving
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TABLE 16

»'X *,r
#

MEAN RANK ORDER FOR SIGNIFICANT TRAIT VALENCE BY
SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE INTERACTIONS
Positive Traits

Variable Name

Highest
Me an

Lowest
Meana

Admirable

S0b

NO

UFB

SC

SFB

Desires to Look Good

SO

SC

UFB

SFB

NO

Emotionally Healthy

NO

SO

SFB

SC

UFB

Negative Traits
Admirable

NO

SO

SFB

UFB

SC

Desires to Look Good.

SO

NO

SFB

SC

UFB

Emotionally Healthy

NO

SO

SC

SFB

UFB

aLowest means are most like variable, i.e., most
admirable, etc.
bThe following abbreviations were used:
SO
UFB
SFB
SC
NO

=
=
=

Note.
ferent .

self-observation
unsolicited feedback
solicited feedback
social comparison
no ending condition
Underlined sources are not significantly dif
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TABLE 17
MEAN RANK ORDER FOR SIGNIFICANT TRAIT VALENCE BY CHARACTER
SEX BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE CONDITION
INTERACTIONS FOR MALE CHARACTERS
Positive Traits

Variable Name

Lowest
Meana

Highest
Mean

Potent

S0b

NO

SC

UFB

SFB

Active.

SO

SC

NO

UFB

SFB

Popular

NO

SO

UFB

SFB

SC

Has Control Over Own Life

NO

SO

SC

SFB

UFB

Curious

SO

NO

SFB

SC

UFB

Intelligent

SO

NO

UFB

SC

SFB

Negative Traits
Potent

NO

SFB

UFB

SO

SC

Active

NO

SO

UFB

SFB

SC

Popular

SFB

inC

SO

SC

UFB

Has Control Over Own Life

NO

so

SC

UFB

SFB

Curious

SC

SO

SFB

NO

UFB

Intelligent

NO

so

SFB

SC

UFB

"‘Lowest Mean s are most like variable name , i .e . most
potent, etc.
°The following abbreviations were used:
SO =
UFB =
SFB -SC =
NO ~
Note.
ferent .

self-observation
unsolicited feedback
solicited feedback
social comparison
no ending condition
Underlined sources are not significally dif
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TABLE 18
MEAN RANK ORDER FOR SIGNIFICANT TRAIT VALENCE BY CHARACTER
SEX BY SOURCE OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE CONDITION
INTERACTIONS FOR FEMALE CHARACTERS
Positive Traits

Variable Name

Highest
Mean

Lowest
Mean3

Potent

SO

SC

UFB

SFB

NO

Active

SO

SC

NO

UFB

SFB

Popular

SO

SFB

SC

NO

UFB

Has Control Over Own Life

NO

SO

SC

SFB

UFB

Curious

SFB

SC

NO

UFB

SO

Intelligent

NO

SFB

SC

SO

UFB

Negative Traits
Potent

•NO

SFB

UFB

SO

SC

Active

NO

UFB

SO

SFB

sc

Popular

NO

SFB

SO

UFB

sc

Has Control Over Own Life

NO

SO

SC

UFB

SFB

Curious

NO

SFB

SC

SO

UFB

Intelligent

NO

SO

SFB

SC

UFB

“Lowest means are most like variable name . i .e ., most
potent, etc,
•»

°The following abbreviations were used:
SO
UFB
SFB
SC
NO

=
=
=
~

Note.
ferent .

self-observation
unsolicited feedback
solicited feedback
social comparison
no ending condition
Underlined sources are not significantly dif
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character sex, this variable is also difficult to summarize.
There is only one main effect for character sex which is not
qualified by interactions, females ’’desire to look better"
than males.

In several cases, i.e., "friendly," "nice,"

"likable," and "have for a friend," the character sex
effects seem to be due to very harsh ratings given to male
«
characters who learn negative traits. With a 'few other
variables females learning negative traits in some of the
source of self-knowledge conditions produce the "main
effect."

These cases show trait effects for social compari

son and self observation for "curious," "intelligent,"
"potent," "popular," and "active"; for unsolicited feedback
with "potent,” "curious" and "active"; solicited feedback
with "intelligent" and "active" and the no ending condition
with "potent."
Perhaps the simplest variable to summarize is subject
sex.

Female subjects tended to rate all subjects as

"nicer," more "likable" and more the type of person whose
company they would "enjoy" than did male subjects.

With

the interactions involving subject sex it was found that
with positive traits female subjects rated female characters
as the least "active" and with negative traits each subject
sex rates similarly sexed characters the least "active."
Results of the Ranking Variables
The second major set of variables in this study was a
set of ranking variables similar to those used by Schoeneman
(1981) and Nash and Schoeneman (Note 1).

The ANOVA procedure was used to determine if the rank
ing variables computed for the 4 traits used in the stories
produced different results than for the 6 other traits used
in the ranking procedure.

It was also, of course, possible

to examine the data for sex and trait valence effects.
No condition or subject sex main effects or inter
actions reached significance.

The only significant effects

are for comparison of experimental vs. nonexperimental
(i.e., group of 4 traits vs. group of 6 traits) for mean
rank of self-observation (F [1, 183] = 12.50, p < .0005),
feedback (F [1, 185] = 6.38, p < .0124), and for the number
of times "not applicable" was used for self-observation (F
[1, 183] = 5.54, p < .0196), and feedback (F [1, 187] 7.12, p < .0083) (see Table 19).
These results seem to indicate that use of the 4
experimental words made all subjects 1) interpret selfobservation better apparently at the expense of feedback
and 2) rate self-observation and feedback as more
inappropriate ways to learn things about themselves.

Results of the Personality Scales
The last section of results to be examined involves
the 4 personality scales.

Each of these scales was used

as a grouping variable and ANOVA's were computed for
personality scales by source of self-knowledge condition
and for personality scale by subject sex.

The group varia
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bles used were students high and low on each scale as
determined by median splits (see Table 20).
TABLE 19
MEANS FOR RANKING VARIABLES
y

.
'•
.. . ■■

Group
Set of 4
Traits

Set of 6
Traits

All 10
Traits

Source of Self -Knowledge

Variables

SelfObservation

Feedback

Social
Comparison

Mean Ranks

1.61

2.08

2.18

Rating of Not
Applicable

0.53

0.64

0.63

Mean Ranks

1.76

1.97

2.22

Rating of Not
Applicable

0.39

0.49

0.56

Mean Ranks

1.69

2.03

2.20

Rating of Not
Applicable

0.46

0.56

0.60

Self-Consciousness Scale
The self-consciousness scale is composed of three sub
scales, each of which was examined separately.

The average

score on the Private Self-Consciousness Scale was 23.5A
with a median value of 24.

No main effects, i.e. , ’.'condi

tion,” "subject sex," "character sex," "trait valence,” or
"private self-consciousness," were significant for any of
the ranking and rating variables.

The only interaction to

reach significance was for "private self-consciousness" by
"source condition" for the potency scale (F [4, 186] - 2.54,

TABLE 20
MEDIANS, MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR
THE PERSONALITY QUESTIONNAIRES

Scale Name

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Median

Private Self-Consciousnessa

23.57

4.69

24

Public Self-Consciousness3

19.57

4.72

20

Social Anxiety"*

13.22

4.73

13

State Anxiety0

37.64

10.47

37

Trait Anxiety^

39.79

9.45

39

Social Desirability Scale

14.74

5.86

15

Self-Monitoring Scale

12.16

4.03

12

o

\-

These, scales compose the Self-Consciousness Scale.

“These scales compose the Spieiberger State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory.
p < .0413).

Post hoc analysis indicates that for low

private subjects the characters in the no ending and self
observation conditions are more potent than comparison and
solicited feedback, unsolicited feedback users are more
potent than solicited feedback users, while no differences
were found for subjects high in private self-consciousness.
It was also noted that the low trait subjects rate self
observation more potent than high subjects while high sub
jects rate solicited feedback as more potent than low trait
subj ects.
For the Public Self-Consciousness scale, with a mean of
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19.57 and a median of 20, only one significant difference
was found.

High public subjects rate characters as desiring

to look better than do their lower counterparts (F [1, 180] =
5.88, p < .0163).
The third measure of the Self-Consciousness Scale is
social anxiety which had a mean of 13.22 and a median of 13.
Social anxiety produced twm> significant interactions with
source of self-knowledge condition:

the evaluative (F [4,

186] = 2.57, p < .0338) and potency scale of the semantic
differential (F [4, 186] = 2.87, p < .0243).
Post hoc analysis indicates that low social anxiety
scorers report self-observers as better people and comparers
as worse people while subjects in the high social anxiety
group report reverse tendencies.
Results of the potency scale show that low social
anxiety subjects rate self-observers and receivers of
unsolicited feedback as more potent and receivers of
solicited feedback as less potent while high social anxiety
subjects report the opposite pattern,
A second set of two-way interactions was produced
between trait valence and the Social Anxiety Scale for the
following variables:

likable (F [1, 182] = 6.93, p < .0092),

nice (F [1, 182] - 3.95, p < .0483), popular (F [1, 180] =
5.38, p < .0215), enjoy the person's company (F [1, 180] =
9.74, p < .0020), have for a friend (F [1, 180] = 9.09, p <
.0029), emotionally healthy (F [1, 180] - 6.13, p < .0142)’
and in control of own life (F [1, 180] = 4.59, p < .0335).

Post hoc analysis of these interactions suggests that
high social anxiety subjects rate learners using both positive and negative traits to be more likable, nice, popular,
enjoyable, emotionally healthy and in control than low
social anxiety scorers rate users of negative traits.

High

and low social anxiety subjects also see positive traits
differently.

High subjects see positive trait users as more

the type of person to have for a friend and as less emo
tionally healthy and less in control while

low social

anxiety subjects would not have them for a friend yet see
them as healthier and more in control.
Two significant three-way interactions were found
between trait valence, character sex and social anxiety.
For the variables popular (F [1, 180] =7.18, p < .0081) and
curious (F [1, 180] = 5.09, p < .0252), post hoc tests
indicate that low social anxiety subjects see the positive
trait female characters group as more popular and curious
than high social anxiety subjects.
In addition the low group sees negative males as more
curious than the high group.

Significant differences are

also made between the different characters by the low social
anxiety group.

They see negative females as less popular

and curious than positive males and females and also see
negative males as less popular than positive females.
State-Trait Anxiety Scale
The results of this scale produced a state anxiety mean

of

37.64

and medi a n

and median

of

39.

of

37

These

and

a trait

analyses

scale mean

produced

only

of
a

39.79

few

sig-

r■

nificant effects for the state scale and none for the trait
measure.
One main effect for state anxiety was found for the
variable admirable-not admirable, F (1, 182) = 9.12, p <
.0029.

The direction of this effect was such that low state

anxiety subjects rate story characters as more admirable
than high anxiety subjects.

The only other significant

results for state anxiety are for two interactions with
subject sex:

For the variables admirable (F [1, 188] =

4.04, p < .0460) and for desire to look good (F [1, 186] 6.39, p < .0123).

These results suggest female subjects

low in state anxiety see characters as more admirable and
desiring to look good than highly anxious females while low
anxiety males report characters as more admirable than high
anxiety female subjects.
Social Desirability Scale
For subjects in the present study a mean of 14.74 and
median of 15 was obtained.

Analysis of this personality

characteristic produced one significant main effect for the
variable Mcurious-not curious" (F [1, 186] = 6.44, p < .0120)
and no interactions with source of self-knowledge, subject
sex or any of the other variables.

The direction of the

finding reported above suggests that high social desira-
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bility subjects see characters as less curious than do their
low social desirability counterparts.
Self-Monitoring Scale
The self-Monitoring Scale produced a mean of 12.16 and
a median of 12.

This scale produced no main effects but

several significant two- and three-way interactions.
Self-monitoring by source condition produced one sig
nificant effect fof curious-not curious, F (4, 180) = 2.45,
p < .0479.

This result is such that it suggests low self

monitors view self-observation users as more curious and
unsolicited feedback users less curious than do high self
monitors.

Additionally it indicates low self-monitors view

the self-observation user as more curious than the
unsolicited feedback user.

The high self-monitors view the

no source user as more curious than all but the unsolicited
feedback group.
Self-monitoring by trait valence was significant for
the variable, has control over own life, F (1, 180) ~ 4.00,
p < .0479.

The direction of these results suggest that

negative trait learners are seen as having less control
than those using positive traits by both high and low self
monitors.

The high self-monitors also see negative trait

users as having less control than the low group.
One interaction was also produced with subject sex for
admirable-not admirable, F (1, 188) = 4.25, p < .0406.

This

suggests
admirable

female
than

high
do

self-monitors

either high

or

view

characters

low male

as

less

subjects.

The final set of res\alts are three three-way inter
actions, for the activity scale of the semantic differential
for trait valence by character sex by self-monitoring (F fl,
192] = 8.75, p < .0035), character sex by subject sex by
self-monitoring (F [1, 192] = 5.60, p < .0190), and trait
valence by subject sex by self-monitoring (F [1, 192] =
4.36, p < .0380) .
Post hoc analysis of the interaction with trait and
character sex reveals that .both low and high self-monitors
viewT female characters learning a negative trait as the
least active group.

The high self-monitors report that

negative-female and positive-male, are less active, positive
females are more active than the low self-monitors group.
For the interaction with character and subject sex the data
suggest female low self-monitoring subjects report female
characters as less active than high female subjects.

Both

low male and female subjects report the opposite sex as
more active than do high subjects.

In the final interaction

with "trait valence" and "subject sex" low self-monitoring
male subjects see negative traits as more active while low
female subjects see positive traits as more active, than do
their high counterparts.

Low female subjects also see

negative traits as less active than high females.
Summary
To briefly review the effects of the personality

questionnaires, it was found that only two scales, State
Anxiety and Social Anxiety, produced interpretable results.
State Anxiety results suggest that both male and female low
anxiety subjects report characters as more '’admirable” than
high anxiety subjects.

The results of the other scale

producing significant interpretable results, social anxiety,
suggests that: low social anxiety subjects tended to report
self-observers as better and more potent people .

A set of

interactions with trait valence suggested that high social
j
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anxiety subjects see positive and negative trait users in
a better light than low social anxiety subjects see nega
tive trait learners.

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Three aspects of this study's findings are considered
below.

The first deals with the ranking variables which

are similar to those used by Schoeneman (1981) and Nash and
Schoeneman (Note 1).

These data served as a replication and

point of comparison between the present and earlier studies
of the -reports of the sources of self-knowledge.

The second

part considers the data of primary importance to this study;
that generated by the subjects' ratings of the story char
acters.

The final area of discussion is a look at the

results of the personality questionnaires.

During each of

these independent discussions, the predictions from Chapter
II and the results from Chapter IV are frequently summarized
and briefly reviewed.
The Ranking Variables
Briefly restated, the rationale for including a set of
ranking variables similar to those used by Schoeneman (1981)
and Nash and Schoeneman (Note 1) was twofold.

First of all

it allowed for some comparison between this study and the
earlier ones.

Secondly it allowed for an experimental

manipulation to see if the source of self-knowledge
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conditions would affect the ranking of either the 4 adjec
tives used in the experimental stories or the 6 adjectives
subjects were not exposed to during the story rating part
of this study.
The main finding of. the ranking variables is a repli
cation of the mean rank results reported by Schoeneman
(1981) and Nash and Schoeneman (Note 1).

The mean ranks,

for self-observation/feedback/social comparison, of 1.61/
2.08/2.18 for the 4 adjective, set and 1.76/1.97/2.22 for the
remaining 6 adjectives are quite similar to figures reported
by Schoeneman (1931) 1.60/2.0/2.3 and Nash and Schoeneman
(Note 1) 1.58/1.r 7/2.33.

In this study, just as In all

previous ones, the mean ranks fall into non-overlapping
ranges such that self-observation is ranked as the most
preferred source, social comparison the least preferred and
feedback Is in the middle position.
Such a close replication of earlier results was not
obtained with the "not applicable" rating used in the. rank
ing procedure.

The average ratings of "not applicable," for

self-observation/feecibsck/social comparison, for the 4
traits were

. 5 3 / . 64/.63,

for the 6 traits .39/.49/.56 while

Schoeneman (1981) reported mean ranks of

.2 /.1 /.7

and Schoeneman (Note 1) reported .07/.33/.50.

and Nash

The main

difference seems to be a more frequent use of the "not
applicable" rating for self-observation in the present
study.
One possible explanation for this difference in
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subjects’ use of the not applicable rating involves a
methodological difference between the present and earlier
studies.

In this study subjects were given the ranking

items with the adjective already in place.

Schoeneman

(1981) and Nash and Schoeneman (Note 1) both used a random
number procedure to select adjectives from a completed
Adjective Checklist (Gough & Heilbrun 1965) which subjects
then inserted into the ranking sentence stem.

Thus, the

current subjects ranked a set of adjectives which may or may
not have been appropriate for them while subjects in the
previous studies ranked adjectives they had earlier indi
cated as being self-descriptors.

In this case, then it is

likely that it is the adjectives themselves which are
"not applicable" and not the sources of self-knowledge.
It is encouraging that, overall, these ranking results
so closely replicate the results of Schoeneman (1981) and
Nash and Schoeneman (Note 1).

This additional replication

underscores both the robustness and reliability of the
report's of the sources of self-knowledge phenomenon first
noted by Schoeneman by showing that his typically urbanized
eastern subjects and two temporally separated groups of
rural midwestern subjects all produce similar results.
This replication is also important to the current investi
gation.
Had the ranking variables failed to replicate
Schoeneman's earlier work it would have been very difficult
to interpret any of the other portions of this study.

By no
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means does the replication allow the results of the self
projection hypothesis to be freely (and inappropriately)
generalized to other populations.

However, it does indicate

that the present group of subjects reports the sources of
self-knowledge in a manner consistent with the other
reported studies.
The second reason the ranking data were included was to
see if subject sex, source of self-knowledge condition or
the number of traits (i.e., 4 vs. 6) produced any signifi
cant differences.

In Chapter IV it was noted that the only

significant results were four main effects for the variable
"number of traits."

These results show that in comparison

to the 6-adjective group the 4-adjective group ranked self
observation lowest hence a better soui'ce, feedback higher
hence a worse source, while both self-observation and feed
back are rated "not applicable" more often.
One possible explanation for these four effects is that
the four adjectives used in the stories are less desirable
and/or less representative of traits possessed by student
subjects.

Unknown to the author while this study was being

designed, the adjectives chosen for use in the other 6
ranking items were included in Anderson's (1968) table of
likableness ratings.

Examination of these likableness

ratings showed that the average rating for the experimental
words was 299 while the other 6 adjectives had an average
score of 411 (within a range of 26 to 573 where higher
equals more "likability").

This might make the subjects
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more likely to disavow having these 4 less "likable" traits
an outcome which may be reflected in the more frequent use
of "not applicable" while those who do want to learn about
the trait prefer the more private mode of self-observation.
Currently such a hypothesis is only speculative and no
definitive statement can be made regarding these data since
the meaningfulness discrepancy was confounded by prior
exposure to some words and none to others.

The hypothesis

that different sources of self-knowledge are preferable
when learning about different, traits is an attractive and
plausible one; however, additional research is the only
method to determine the validity of such a hypothesis.
For completeness sake it also should be noted that,
given the large number of analyses done and small number of
significant effects found, it is possible that these effects
are chance occurrences.

Once again, additional research is

the only method to document the nature, including the
reliability, of these findings.
The Story Rating Variables
Of all the predictions made in the course of this
investigation, those concerning the self-projection hypothe
sis are the most important.

Due to the repeated measures

design of the story rating task it was possible to examine
several other independent variables in addition to looking
at the effects of different source of self-knowledge condi
tions.

The present section covers all of these variables

102

beginning with the effects of trait valence, the ratings of
the sources and finally the effects of subject and character
sex.
Trait Valence Hypotheses
Though the effects of trait valence are not the primary
issues of importance in this project, it seemed reasonable
to examine them before going on to the self-projection
hypotheses.

This decision was based not only on this

variable's large number of significant results and numerous
interactions but because an examination of trait valence
will also facilitate, an understanding of other hypotheses
and results in this study.
The results of trait valence indicate that, whenever
this dimension produces significant results, learners of
positive traits are rated more toward the positive end of
the item. pair.

Even though the significant results of this

variable are often isolated to a specific sex or source of
self-knowledge condition, the finding that negative traits
consistently, i.e., only one exception, produce more "nega
tive" ratings gives strong support to the notion that
personality judgments may be organized schematically (Taylor
& Crocker 1981).

Although there are no empirical data on

this point, it seems quite unlikely that a relationship
actually exists between the learning of bad traits and low
intelligence and any of the other 17 undesirable traits.
However, the schematic organization hypothesis can account
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for such a finding.

Many studies were cited earlier which

suggest that a connotative or semantic similarity between
events is often used as a basis for perceiving a correlation
to exist between them.

The subjects in this study seem to

have fallen prey to the appealing yet incorrect belief that
good goes with good and bad with bad.
Earlier it was mentioned that it was important to
examine the trait valence data before going on to other
data.

Although the data do not address the issue of whether

or not the sources of self-knowledge are represented sche
matically, they do offer support for the position that
subjects' ratings of story characters may be influenced by
schematically organized information.

A second implication

is that the positive and.negative trait groups may have an
empirical distinction between them; this notion is clearly
supported by the numerous interactions of trait valence with
other independent variables.
The Self-Projection Hypothesis
Before the discussion of the self-projection hypothesis
two reminders are in order.

First, it should be recalled

that in this portion of the experimental task although sub
jects were called on to rate story characters who learn
about themselves via the different sources of self-knowledge,
it is assumed that they are actually making decisions based
on a schematic-like representation of the source of selfknowledge used by that character.

Secondly, to briefly

restate the self-projection predictions, it was expected
that users of Self-observation would be. seen in the most
positive manner, users of social comparison in the least
positive, ratings of users 6f unsolicited feedback would
vary with trait valence (the compliment or insult), while
those for solicited feedback and the no source of selfknowledge ending would produce more neutral or "middle of
the road" evaluations relative to the other sources.
The source of self-knowledge condition analyses pro
duced mixed support for the predictions mentioned above;
self-observation, solicited feedback and social comparison
most closely followed these predictions while unsolicited
feedback and the no source condition did not.

A second

point that must be considered is that subjects' ratings of
the different sources are much more complex in terms of
interacting with trait valence and character sex than
predicted.
Based on the reports given by subjects of this study,
users of self-observation seem to often be rated differently
than users of other sources.

As the data summarized in

Chapter IV in Tables 16, 17, and 12 illustrate, the self
observation bias generally involves favorable ratings.
Indeed, in only one case, i.e., positive female characters
using unsolicited feedback are more "curious" than self
observers, is this source rated inferior to another source.
In the remaining cases it is either better than or equal to
the other sources.

This is very strong support for the
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hypothesis that subjects' preference for self-observation
(Schoeneman 1981; Nash & Schoeneman Note 1; Schoeneman,
Tabor & Nash Note 2) is due to an implicit bia'.

The item

pairs which reached significance plus trait and character
sex restrictions where applicable suggest some characteris
tics of this bias.

For both character sexes this bias seems

to tap social approval features, being "enjoyable,"
"similar," "admirable," and "desiring to look good."

A

second set is more character sex specific and typically
involves males learning both positive and negative traits
but only females learning positive traits.

This set seems

similar to locus of control and involves being more "active,
"potent," "in control," and "curious" than sources such as
social comparison or the feedback conditions.
Social comparison was reported, as predicted, as a
relatively unfavorable method of learning about the self.
It would be incorrect, however, to characterize social com
parison as the least favorable of all the sources on all
rating scales.

Overall it is the least "admirable" source

when negative traits are learned.

The three-way inter

actions (trait by character sex by source condition) show
that, generally, with negative traits it is less "curious,"
"potent," "active," and "in control" than'the feedback
groups while with positive traits it is more "active" than
the feedback groups.

This outcome contradicts the predic

tion that social comparison users would suffer less from
negative traits because it is a. private source.

One
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possible explanation for the preference of feedback over
comparing when learning negative traits may be that it
seems to take more strength of character to solicit feedback
in negative circumstances.

Thus feedback’s use involves

what some consider to be open and healthy self-disclosure
(Jourard 1971) while comparison may seem to have a component
of purposeful secretiveness.

All such speculation aside,

this finding does indicate that, for some reason, comparison
is reported to be particularly inappropriate when learning
about undesirable traits.
Thus, the most frequent result was that comparison
served as a negative anchor.

That is to say other sources

were typically rated better relative to it.

Indeed, com

parison was never'reported in a. manner suggesting that it
was preferable to self-observation and only twice was it
preferable to solicited feedback or the no ending group.
Such findings are consistent with the self-projection
prediction that social comparison is the least often
reported source of self-knowledge (Scnoeneman 1981; Nash &
Schoeneman Note 1) due to people's perception of it as an
inferior method of self-validation.
It is more difficult to evaluate the predictions made
regarding solicited, feedback.

Recall that this source was

expected to receive a "middle of the road" rating.

The most

noticeable trend with this variable is for male characters
who use it to be seen as less "active" and "in control"
regardless of trait valence, less "potent" and "popular"
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with positive traits and less "intelligent” with negative
traits.

Female users are less "active" and more "curious"

regardless of trait valence, more "in control" with positive
ones and more "potent" with negative ones.

Thus, data sug

gest the predictions of an intermediate ranking are more
correct for female than male characters.
The remaining source of self-knowledge conditions,
unsolicited feedback and the no source ending, produced
results' which differed substantially from the predictions.
It had been predicted that with positive traits unsolicited
feedback would be rated favorably as a compliment and with
negative traits rated less favorably as an insult.

However,

unsolicited feedback was consistently reported as a poor
way to learn about the self.

In no instance w?as it reported

as superior to self-observation, the no source condition or
solicited feedback. An interpretation more in keeping with
>
the data might be that, as a hapless recipient of informa
tion, the social situation seemed out of the character's
control.

This-perceived loss of control then may have

resulted in a very poor evaluation of these characters by
the subjects.
The results of the no source condition also deviated
in a rather surprising manner from the predictions made
about it.

Not only did this condition fail to produce

neutral ratings, in most cases it resulted in the best
character evaluations.

This is especially true for female

characters learning negative traits.

Since subjects most
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favorably endorse characters who learn nothing about them
selves., i.e., those who use none of the sources of selfknowledge, the question "Is it better to not learn anything
about yourself?" is raised.
The data certainly seem to suggest that, based on selfprojection features, not only can subjects differentiate
between various methods of learning about themselves, but
that they might prefer to just not learn.

Alternatively it

may be that subjects simply assume that characters are
already in possession of self-knowledge and thus seem more
self-reliant, potent and secure.

These presumed character

istics would almost certainly produce very favorable ratings
much like the ones found in this study.

Regardless of which

interpretation of this data is accepted, it brings up an
interesting point:

it is better not to be actively involved

in the self-validation process.

The data do not address

whether this is because an individual does not want to learn
anything or simply prefers to think that information about
him or herself is already possessed.

Should the latter

account be correct a doiible standard is suggested? there is
more approval for having knowledge about the self than for
any of the methods of obtaining this knowledge.
To briefly reiterate the predictions and questions
associated with the two sex variables it may be recalled
that evidence supporting a male, preference for social com
parison was expected.

Since no predictions other than this
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Subject sex analyses reveal that women subjects reported
story characters as "nicer," more "likable" and "more as
someone with whom they would associate" than did male sub
jects.

Since subject sex failed to produce any significant

interactions with the source of self-knowledge condition,
no support for the notion that men report social comparison
more favorably than women can be reported.
The analysis of character sex data showed only one main
effect, i.e., women are rated more as "desiring to look
good," that was not subsequently influenced by interactions.
Other character sex effects are more complex.

One pattern

suggests males learning negative traits cause the signifi
cant effects while another pattern involves females learning
negative traits in specific source of self-knowledge
conditions.
The first pattern, composed of the rating variables
"friendly," "likable," "nice" and "have for a friend," seem
to tap elements of interpersonal attraction.

With this set

of variables males learning negative traits are reported to
be less attractive, i.e., less "friendly," less "likable,"
etc., than males who learn positive traits or women who
learn either positive or negative traits.

These interaction

data seem to suggest that in terms of interpersonal attrac
tion women are not affected by trait valence while men
suffer significantly from association with negative traits.
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The second pattern, which is more complex than the
first, involves variables which seem to make up more of a
"personal effectiveness" component involving variables such
as "curious," "intelligent," "potent," "active" and
"popular."

On all five of these variables, the character

sex effects are due to the very negative ratings given to
women characters learning negative traits in, primarily, the
social comparison and self-observation conditions.

The

variables "curious," "potent," and "active" also produce a
character sex effect for unsolicited feedback, "intelli
gent" and "active" for solicited feedback, while only
"potent" was significant in the no ending group.

One

hypothesis regarding these data is'that women are both more
adversely affected by learning negative traits than men in
terms of "personal effectiveness" and affected more in
internal, private modes of self-validation such as selfobsex'vation and social comparison.
The findings that association with negative traits
leads to lower ratings for men on "interpersonal attraction"
variables and lower ratings for women on "personal effec
tiveness" variables is especially interesting in light of
the "traditional sex stereotypes."

For example, Deaux

(1976) reports that men are typically seen as independent,
competitive, objective, dominant, active, logical, ambitious,
self-confident as well as less emotionally responsive.
Similarly Heath and Gurwitz (Note 7) report men as

independent, aggressive, competitive, strong, logical,
competent and unemotional.
The set of traits involved in the interactions having
to do with interpersonal attraction seems to be more in
line with a traditional female stereotype.

This is quite

interesting because the use of positive traits does not
affect male characters and, indeed, they are not signifi
cantly different from the ratings of the females.

The

learning of negative traits results in a significant and
substantial decrement in males' ratings of attractiveness.
Overall the lack of differentiation of women characters by
trait valence suggests that women are rated high on the
interpersonal attraction dimension (composed of stereotypically female attributes) regardless of trait valence.
By way of contrast the trait variable is very important for
male characters and suggests that when males are judged on
traditionally female traits it js done more critically,
though not necessarily more accurately, and situational
factors are given more weight.
A somewhat similar interpretation emerges from the
second pattern showing women characters suffer from associa
tion with negative traits on traditionally male traits.
These data suggest that while negative traits somewhat
affect both sexes, women are still significantly affected to
a greater degree and more often than men.
To summarize, it seems that each sex's association with
negative traits results in harsher character ratings on

items traditionally thought to be representative of the
opposite sex.

One possible account for this is that when

judging, for example, women on "women's traits," trait
valence information is not used because of our schemas of
women •Which allow us to rate them favorable on the tradi
tionally "women's traits."

For example we all "know" that

women are "nice" so we can discount the fact that she is
learning a negative (not "nice") trait because it is not
really true since "we know how women really are."

However,

when judging a man on the "women's traits" people may not
be able to recall appropriate schemas with which to make
decisions and may then use the "trait valence" data as the
judgmental criteria.

Even if a schema can be recalled, it

would violate the traditional sex. role (a sensitive man or
an aggressive woman).

This might cause people to disregard

the schema as being "in error” and thus trait valence data
is consulted in making the judgment.

This latter hypothesis

seems somewhat unlikely .since, as presented earlier, research
suggests.people are very poor at detecting bchemas that are
"in error."

These two hypotheses

would

be interesting ones

to investigate in future research.
Several other points in regard to the "character sex"
data are also important.

First of all, it can be noted that

the character sex ratings are in agreement with the stereo
type literature such as reported by Deaux (1976) and Heath
and Gurwitz (Note 7).

The only possible disagreement

involves the current findings noted above which suggest that
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character sex is not a simple effect but interacts with
other variables.
A second point worth noting is that there was an over
lap between the way women story characters were rated and
the way women subjects tended to respond.

This overlap

involved the variables ’’likable" and "have for a friend."
It would be an inappropriate overgeneralization (especially
in the context of a study investigating implicit and
erroneous personality judgments) to conclude that this data
suggest that women are actually more "likable” and prefera
ble to "have for a friend" even though this Interpretation
has a certain common sense validity to it.
A move parsimonious interpretation is that the women
subjects were aware of the "traditional" women's stereotype
and for some reason their ratings conformed to it.

Such a

hypothesis has been demonstrated by Zanna and Pack (1975)
who found that women could conform to stereotypes held by
desirable others.

Whether or not the women subjects in the

present study perceived psychological research as having
positive or negative demand characteristics is an empirical
question beyond the scope of this study.
At this point all the main effects and interactions of
the story character rating study have been presented.

The

final aspect of the story rating study was the data produced
by the ratings of the accuracy, believability and relia
bility of the sources of self-knowledge.

The predictions

that these variables would parallel character rating were

not supported; indeed, the only significant effects to be
found were main effects for trait valence on all three
ratings.

Thus, all sources are more accurate, believable

and reliable when learning about good traits.
Putting aside intuitive or common sense interpretations
the real importance of these data is why trait valence
reached significance in the absence of any other main
effects or interactions.

In light of the demonstration that

personality judgments of characters are influenced by
schematic-like properties of the different sources, it is
very surprising that the ratings of the sources themselves
do not also show these effects.
these data are possible.

Several interpretations of

The first, and simplest, would

suggest that subjects cannot or do not distinguish between
the accuracy, reliability and believability of the different
sources.

This seems unlikely especially given the pro

nounced effects of the sources on the personality judgments.
However, it is probably more important to note that in each
set of stories the character never voiced dissatisfaction or
questioned the source of self-knowledge that he or she had
used.

Thus, this passive acceptance of information may have

been interpreted by subjects as a "vote of confidence" for
the source.
Research findings from the social judgment and attributional literature suggest another explanatory hypothesis.
For some reason it seems that the effects of the trait
valence dimension were so powerful that they were "carried
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over" onto this set of ratings while the less powerful
effects either lacked such strength or were for some reason
discounted from judgments of the actual sources.

This

"discounting process" may have been the availability
heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman 1982).

The vividness

criteria, discussed as one form of the availability
heuristic in Chapter II, suggest that vivid data and con
crete examples are more often used in decisions than more
abstract or pallid information.

The stories used for the

character rating task were concrete and vivid examples of,
for example, a self-observer in contrast to the source
rating task which involved rating an abstract concept such
as self-observation.

Accordingly, subjects were likely to

underutilize information while rating the actual source and
hence differences were less likely to be found.
Similar conclusions can also be drawn by examining a
special case, of the availability heuristic--the fundamental
attribution error (Nisbett & Ross 1980).

This proposal

states that attributions of causality are more often made
to characterological factors than to situational ones
because of the vividness and salience of the actor as
opposed to the situation.

Thus, in the present study self

observation, or any source, seems more a function or trait
of the story character while any features of self
observation as an independent process are much less apparent.
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Personality Scale Variables
The only two scale results meriting discussion are the
Spielberger State Anxiety Scale and the Social Anxiety Sub
scale of The Self-Consciousness Scale.

Spielberger State

Anxiety results indicate that low-anxiety subjects report
story characters as more admirable than do high-anxiety
subjects.

More specifically low-anxiety female subjects

report characters as more admirable and desiring to look
good than high-anxiety females, while similarly, lowanxiety males report the characters as more admirable than
high-anxiety males.

While this result is interesting the

focal nature of one effect on only one variable limits its
contribution to this study.

Indeed, it has nothing to offer

regarding the reports of the sources of self-knowledge and
very little to an understanding of the more general study of
stereotypes.
Social anxiety was the only scale to produce signifi
cant results applicable to the reports of the sources of
self-knowledge.

Although no main effects were found, social

anxiety by source conditions interactions were evident on 2
of the semantic differential scales.

Low social anxiety

subjects report self-observers the most "potent1' and "good"
characters while subjects high on social anxiety report
self-observers as the least "potent" and "worst" characters.
The high social anxiety subjects see comparers as the "best"
characters and unsolicited feedback users as the most potent
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while low social anxiety subjects see these source users as
the "worst" and least potent respectively.
It is interesting that, based on other data from this
study, low social anxiety subjects prefer the source gen
erally seen in the best light -while high social anxiety
subjects prefer the sources which generated the worst
evaluations.

It may be that high, social anxiety subjects,

who typically feel ill at ease in social situations (Buss
1980), feel that direct comparison or spontaneous feedback
from others is necessary to assuage their feelings of dis
comfort in social situations.
Alternatively, it can be postulated that the high
social anxiety subjects feel uncomfortable because they
hold a minority opinion.

These subjects report the best and

worst sources in a pattern opposite to the majority of sub
jects in this study.

One may speculate that these subjects

may be aware that they hold a divergent, or statistically
abnormal, view and because of this feel uncomfortable.
’Other results of the Social Anxiety Scale do not deal
directly with the study of the sources of self-knowledge.
Interactions with, trait valence reveal that high socialanxiety subjects tend to be kinder in their ratings of those
characters learning about negative traits.

They report them

as being more likable, nice, popular, enjoyable, emotionally
healthy, and in control.

Perhaps this is because the

process of learning negative things about yourself is not
always a safe-feeling process, and thus seems to coincide

more with their own feelings of social discomfort.

Some

support for this is evident since, in contrast to low social
anxiety subjects, the more socially anxious individuals see
positive trait learners as less emotionally healthy and less
. . . . . . .
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in control yet as more the type of person to have for a
friend.
General, Discussion and Summary
By far the most important results in this study are the
ones showing that the source of self-knowledge ending condi
tions differentially affect the ratings of the story
characters.

These results are similar to those predicted by

the self-projection hyp thesis, an outcome which suggests
that self projection and the notion that peoples' tools of
social judgment influence the reports of the sources of
self-knowledge may have been correct.

This study measured

this influence by presenting subjects with a. set of 19
traits which all appear to be different yet are not dis
tinctly different in terms of the self-projection hypothesis'
predictions.

Such a design facilitates the taking of a

descriptive approach, to this study, i.e., what traits
characterize self-observers, comparers and so on.

Indeed,

in attempting to draw overall conclusions from this study,
one is limited to such descriptions since it is not possible
to articulate which social judgment features are responsible
for these results.
Just as it made no difference whether sources were
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predicted to be associated with traits in a schematic
fashion or through heuristic use, it also makes no differ
ence interpretively.

Indeed, it seems likely that there is

both heuristic and schematic involvement in this association
A finer discrimination of the relative contributions of the
various tools of social judgment is dependent on greater
refinements within the study of judgmental processes.
Thus, to take the descriptive approach to this study,
it was found that the source difference involved potency,
activity and a group of traits which seem to tap social
approval features.

The predicted evaluative difference was

not found in this study.

It seems that subjects do make

characterlogical distinctions based on the sources of selfknowledge, people use, however, they are subtler than the ones
predicted.

This does-not minimize the importance of this

study's findings.

It still must be noted that the subjects

have inferred that the story characters possess certain
traits based on inappropriate information, i.e., data that
is situationally based at best.

Because the Inferences are

subtler it seems such inappropriate use of social judgment
is more likely to go undetected and also to go uncorrected.
A surprising finding was subjects' high ranking,
especially in the negative trait condition, of characters in
the "no source" ending condition.

This may be interpreted

in two ways: subjects may not like to learn things about
themselves, in particular if it is something bad, or sub
jects may assume that these characters have already acquired
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self-knowledge which makes them seem very self-reliant,
secure and ’’internal."

While these results were not pre

dicted the data clearly show them, to be both highly
significant and widespread effects.
Another surprising finding involved solicited and
unsolicited feedback and shows that these types of feedback
are reported in quite different manners.

Solicited feedback

remained somewhat neutral and frequently was not differentiated from even the extreme rating polarities.
contrast unsolicited feedback was seen very poorly.

By
Perhaps

this was because these characters aid not seem to be in
control of the social situation or, in Jellison and Green’s
(1981) terms, their method of learning showed no components
of "internality.”
The schematic or heuristic component of social judg
ments in this study seems to involve internality in several
specific ways.

The feedback results show that being the

initiator of the self-learning process, i.e., solicited as
opposed to unsolicited feedback, results in more favorable
ratings.

The ratings of self-observation, solicited feed

back and social comparison indicate that once one begins the
self-validation process the method chosen also has selfpresentational effects.

If one can be self-reliant, such

as in self-observation, the norm of internality is met in
both the intent and process of self-validation and results
in the highest ratings.

Results also suggest that one form

of internality, possession of self-knowledge In the absence
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Solicited feedback and social comparison both meet the
norm of internal!ty in the domain of intent to learn but do
not meet it in the process component.

The process used then

seems to be evaluated on an almost Jourardian (1971) notion.
That is that more open direct validation from others is seen
as preferable to the possibly surreptitious use of social
comparison.
It is interesting that the personality scales failed to
contribute significantly to an understanding of subjects'
reports of the sources of self-knowledge.

Since the inclu

sion of these measures was purely exploratory, the lack of
effects is neither detrimental or helpful to the self
projection hypothesis.

Perhaps the only conclusion which

can be drawn currently is that the implicit organization
found in this study does not seem to be affected by these
few psychometrically assessed traits.

Naturally it may be

that other traits, if studied in the present context, would
further the understanding of these phenomena; however, this
currently does not seem to be a promising topic for inquiry.
The other somewhat -independent part of this study, the
ranking variables, produced more important results.

The

replication of the "mean rank" data was certainly of sig
nificance.

Even though Schoeneman’s original work has been

replicated once, it is reassuring to see the effects first
noted by him replicated again.

Had these results not been
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repeated the whole purpose of this study would have been
questionable; there would have been little justification to
explain an unreliable effect.

So in addition to supporting

the hypothesis of reports of the sources of self-knowledge
as a phenomenon worth researching, this study also demon
strates an equivalence in the perception of this phenomena
between earlier and the present group of subjects.
The main contribution of this study is not the replication of Schoeneman’s (1981) work but showing that the
effects first reported by him seem to be a function of
implicit notions about the sources of self-knowledge.
Findings such as the ones in this study reiterate the
importance of issearching social judgment phenomena.

Any

time large numbers of people hold similar sets of beliefs,
whether they are beliefs about racial or ethnic stereotypes
or about the sources of self-knowledge, it is important for
psychologists to attempt to understand and explain them.
While there are, of course, many issues still unanswered
and unresolved in the study of people's reports of the
sources of self-knowledge, this study has made an important
first step by establishing a link between the study of such
reports and the growing body of 3
ings of social judgment.
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EXPERIMENTAL STORIES

APPENDIX A
I

In this section copies of the four basic experimental
stories and the different source of self-knowledge endings
are reproduced.

In each example the same trait and sex

combination, i.e. , idealistic-male, is used.

Dui'ing the

experiment these same basic stories were modified to other
trait and sex combinations by merely changing the adjective
and/or character names and pronouns.
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STORY 1
The movie had been enjoyable, and. after it was over
Jack and Harry decided to go get a pizza.

They hadn't seen

each other for over a year, since high school graduation.
Each had moved to a different city to start college and now
summer vacation had brought them together.

Now that they

had some time to relax together, they decided to catch up
on old times.

They soon found themselves enjoying the

pizza and conversation much more than the movie.

They

talked about old times and new experiences; living away from
home at college, what the old crowd was up to and how they
had changed.

All this got Jack to thinking about how some

things never change; he asked Harry, "Do you realize how
idealistic our old group was?

Most of them are still that

way, too."
Self-Observation Ending
Both friends were silent for a while, thinking.
started to wonder about himself.
person?

Jack

Was he also an idealistic

He started to recall times before and since gradua

tion when he felt and acted, idealistic.

It seemed to him

that he could recall so many instances of himself as being
idealistic that he knew that he must be an idealistic
person.
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Unsolicited Feedback Ending
Both friends were silent for a while, thinking.
started to wonder about himself.
person?

Jack

Was he also an idealistic

Harry broke the silence by saying, "Speaking of

being idealistic, I would say that I consider you to be an
idealistic person."

It seemed to Jack that Harry’s comment

made an impression; he felt like he knew that he must be an
idealistic person.
Solicited Feedback Ending
Both friends were silent for a while, thinking.
started to wonder about himself.
person?

Jack

Was he an idealistic

Jack looked at Harry and asked him about it.

Harry said, "Idealistic?
idealistic.”

Yeah, sure, I think you're

It seemed to Jack that his own question and

Harry's answer made an impression; he felt like he knew
that he must be an idealistic person.
Social Comoarisen Ending
Both friends were silent for a while thinking.
started to wonder about himself.
person?

Jack

Was he also an idealistic

He thought about his actions and feelings, and

compared them with those he had observed in his friend
Harry.

It seemed to Jack that compared to Harry, he himself
o
was' much more idealistic; Jack felt like he knew himself to
be an idealistic person.

STORY 2
One night two friend's get together to watch some
television and talk.

Dan and Steve spent several hours

together that night, something they hadn't done in a long
time.

They watched a movie on TV for a few hours and after

it went off thev sat around talking for a while longer.*
There was a lot to catch up on:

they brought each other up

to date on what they had been doing and what was going on
with their friends.

Eventually, the conversation became

more general and drifted onto the topic of the different
kinds of people there were in the world.

Steve and Dan got

to talking about idealistic people; they discussed idealism
and how some people are more idealistic than others.
Self-Observation Ending
The more they talked about it, the more Dan began to
wonder about himself.
thought.

"Am I an idealistic person?" he

He then recalled many different occasions when he

had felt idealistic and done, things that seemed to be
idealistic.

In the end, Dan decided that he really was an

idealistic person, since he could remember many times when
his actions and feelings were those of an idealistic person.
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Unsolicited Feedback Ending
The more they talked about it, the more Dan began to
wonder about himself.
thought.

"Am I an idealistic person?" he

As he was thinking about this, his friend said that

Dan seemed to be an idealistic kind of person.

In the end,

Dan decided that he really was an idealistic person because
Steve had said that Dan's actions and feelings were those
of an idealistic person.
Solicited Feedback Ending
The more they talked about it, the more Dan began to
wonder about himself.
thought.

"Am I an idealistic person?" he

He decided that one way to find out if he was

idealistic would be to ask Steve and see what he said.

He

did, and Steve thought about it for a moment before saying
t

that yes, Dan was an idealistic person.

In the end, Dan

decided that he really was an idealistic person because
when he has asked, Steve had said that Dan’s actions and
feelings, were those of an idealistic person.
Social Comparison Ending
The more they talked about it, the more Dan began to
wonder about himself.
thought.

"Am I an idealistic person?" he

He decided that one. way to find out if he was an

idealistic person would be to compare himself with Steve.
Dan thought about his own actions and feelings compared to
Steve’s.

In the end, Dan decided that he really was an
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idealistic person, since his actions and feelings were much

taXAuV.

more idealistic than Steve's.

STORY 3
As Tom and Louis left class, they were deep in
discussion about the day’s topic--abnormal psychology.
They didn't always like their psych class, but today was
different.

The lecturer talked about personality theory

and abnormal psychology, which most of the class seemed to
enjoy for the whole hour.

As Tom and Louis were walking

across campus, they were talking about personality types,
and they got onto the topic of idealistic people.

In

particular, they were thinking of examples of people they
knew who were idealistic and what it was about those people
that made them idealistic.
Self-Observation Ending
As Tom was listening to Louis, be couldn’t help but
wonder if he himself was idealistic.

He remembered a

number of times before college when he had been idealistic.
Tom finally made up his mind that anyone who could recall,
as he had, several instances of idealistic behaviors and
emotions must be an idealistic person.
Unsolicited Feedback Ending
As Tom was listening to Louis, he couldn’t help but
wonder if he himself was idealistic.
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Just then, Louis said,
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"Have you ever thought of yourself as an idealistic person?
I think you fit the pattern pretty well."

Tom finally made

up his mind that anyone like himself who got feedback,
without asking, that they were idealistic, must be an
idealistic person.
Solicited Feedback Ending
As Tom was listening to Louis, he'couldn’t help but
wonder if he himself was idealistic.

Since they were

talking about it, he asked Louis for his opinion. Louis’
reply was, "Yeah, I think you fit the pattern of an
idealistic person pretty well."

Tom finally made up his

mind that anyone who asked for .feedback and was told he
was idealistic, as Louis had told Tom, must be an
idealistic person.
Social Comparison Ending
As Tom was listening to Louis, he couldn’t help but
wonder if he himself was idealistic.

He thought about how

he stacked up in comparison to Louis when it came to
idealistic actions and feelings, and found that he seemed
more idealistic than his friend.

Tom finally made up his

mind that anyone who was more idealistic than a friend (as
he was compared to Louis), must be an idealistic person.

STORY 4
Bill and Dave had just recently met at work, and they
often talked about hunting and fishing during lunch.

So

one day last summer, the two friends decided to go on a
short fishing trip.
lake.

One Saturday they went to a nearby

The first couple of hours, the fish were really

biting:

Bill and Dave both caught several big ones.

As

the morning wore on, the fish weren't biting as much, so
Bill and Dave were doing more talking than fishing.
Although they hadn't known each other very long, they found
they could talk easily about a lot of things.

Soon they

were discussing people and situations at work, and they
found out that they both thought that their boss was an
idealistic person.
Self-Observation Ending
While they talked about their boss, Bill began to
think about what it meant to be an idealistic person.

As

he considered it, he began to recall times he had acted
and felt like an idealistic person.
he really was idealistic.

Bill concluded that

"After all," he thought, "there

are so many times when I've behaved and felt like an
idealistic person.”
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Unsolicited Feedback Ending
While they talked about their boss, Bill began to
think about what it meant to be an idealistic person.

At

that point, Dave said, ’’You know, Bill, I ’ve been thinking
and you seem to me to be idealistic too.”
that he really was idealistic.

Bill concluded

’’After all,” he thought,

"Dave brought it up and told me so."
Solicited Feedback Ending
While they talked about their boss, Bill began to
think about what it meant to be an idealistic person.
asked Dave, "Hey, what about me?
you?"

He

Do I seem idealistic to

David told Bill what he thought being idealistic was

all about, and that he thought Bill fit the bill.
concluded that he really W a s idealistic.

Bill

"After all," he

thought, "i asked Dave and he told me so."
Social Comparison Ending
While they talked about their boss, Bill began to
think about what it meant to be an idealistic person.

As

he thought about this, he considered himself and Da\Te, and
how they were, comparatively.
really was idealistic,

Bill concluded that he

"After all," he thought, "I am a

lot more idealistic than Dave."
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